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December 22, 1993

Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

RE:

Nielson v. Gurley, Case No. 930327-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court
is advised of the recent decision of Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 227 Ut. Adv.
Rep. 64 (Utah App., decided December 7, 1993), which was published subsequent to the brief
of Appellee filed herein on December 9, 1993. The Goodmansen case is believed to be pertinent
and significant to Appellee's arguments for the award of sanctions at Point V, pages 43-48, of
the Brief of Appellee.
The reasons the Goodmansen case is pertinent, briefly stated, are that this Court held that
a settlement agreement, confirmed by an exchange of letters, was valid and binding despite
changes or disputes over insignificant terms. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment, dated
April 28, 1992 and Renewed Motion for Entry of Judgment, dated June 19, 1992 demonstrated
that the Defendant had agreed to settle and reneged on agreements to settle the above-entitled
matter thrice; first, in July of 1991 for the amount of costs incurred ($125.00), together with
restraint of the Defendant's wrongful practices; second, in an agreement entered into with the
Court, for substantially the same amount, as the judgment entered herein, together with the
restraint of Defendant's conduct, confirmed Jby Judge Brian's Minute Entry dated February 24,
1992, and the letter of Assistant Attorney General, Reed M. Stringham, dated February 25, 1992;
and third, by formal settlement agreement signed by Defendant's counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson,
on April 13, 1992, providing for the payment of damages in substantially the amount awarded
herein, together with the restraint of the Defendant.
The Goodmansen holding is pertinent to Judge Young's Conclusions Nos. 8 and 9, R.
1946, that the Defendant's conduct of this litigation was in bad faith, awarding bad faith damages
and enjoining the Defendant individually. Judge Young's "bad faith litigation" ruling was based,
in part, on Defendant's failure to honor settlement agreements entered into by his counsel or to
acknowledge and conform to the Partial Summary Judgment determining his conduct unlawful

Judge Young's conclusions in that regard are evident in Findings of Fact No. 13, R. 1949, that
the Defendant's supervisors at the Division of Wildlife Resources should have "readily
acknowledged and affirmatively restrained" his unlawful activities.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL DARGER
Attorney at Law
DD:kl
cc:
Parker Nielson
Dennis Fergerson
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Plaintiff-Appellee Parker M. Nielson ("Nielson" herein) ,
answers the Brief of Appellant ("Br." herein) of DefendantAppellant Dale Gurley ("Gurley" herein) .
JURISDICTION
This Court is without jurisdiction, timely notice of appeal
not having been filed.

Gurley's citation of Utah Code Ann. §§

78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(k) in support of his claim of
jurisdiction is of no avail, for both contemplate and require
timely notice of appeal.
ANSWER TO "STATEMENT OF ISSUES"
We recognize and acknowledge that it is the province of the
Appellant to frame the issues, for "the party who brings a suit
[or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . ."
Webster
(1989).

v. Reproductive

Health

Services,

492 U.S. 490, 512

Gurley nevertheless misstates the issues, for the Utah

Supreme Court directed decision of the following questions:
1. WHETHER THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED ON FEBRUARY
26, 1993 IS NOT TIMELY, FINAL JUDGMENT HAVING
BEEN ENTERED ON JANUARY 7, 1993 AND NO EXTENSION
OF TIME HAVING BEEN SECURED.
2. WHETHER COUNSEL FOR GURLEY SHOULD BE
SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 33 FOR MISREPRESENTING THE
FACTS, MISREPRESENTING THE RECORD, LACK OF CANDOR
AND BAD FAITH.
The Minute Entry of the Utah Supreme Court dated April 5, 1993,
directed consideration of the first issue, as follows:
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is this day denied,
and the court defers its ruling until plenary
presentation and consideration of the case.
and the Supreme Court's Minute Entry of May 4, 1993 directed

consideration of the second issue:
The Court defers action on the motion for an
award of bad faith damages pending consideration of the appeal on its merits.
Jurisdiction involves a question of law.
Country

Stores

v. Industrial

Commission,

(Utah App., decided Sept. 7, 1993).

Maverick

221 Utah Adv. Rep. p.7

The question of sanctions is

an appeal to this Court's discretion.
Estates,

Cf. ,

Schoney

v. Memorial

224 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App., decided Oct. 25, 1993).
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This case involves construction of the Utah Game Bird Code,
Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-4, et seq.,

the definitions of "Protected

Wildlife" and "Wildlife" at Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2, and the
regulations for the possession of live game birds at Utah Admin.
Code § R608-4-1, et seq.

Said statutes and regulations are

reproduced at Addendum "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of the

Case.

Appellant misstates the case.

This is a simple action for

conversion, interference with contract rights and injunctive
relief.
B.

It has nothing to do with any "trap."

Course

of

Proceedings.

Nielson filed suit against Gurley on September 13, 1990 for
conversion and interference with contract rights incident to a
game farm licensed by the State of Utah.
not pursued at trial.)

(A defamation claim was

Partial Summary Judgment was entered by

the Honorable David S. Young on June 24, 1991.

(Addendum "G.")

After Summary Judgment was entered, Gurley asserted that he acted
1

as a peace officer.

Nielson promptly posted the bond required for

suit against a peace officer, filed a new notice of claim, and
filed a new action seeking injunctive relief.
The two actions, denominated herein as No. 3 02 (the original
conversion/interference with contract claim) and No. 249 (the
claim for injunctive relief), respectively, were consolidated and
went to trial, on the merits, before the Honorable David S. Young,
District Judge sitting without a jury, who found in a Memorandum
Decision at R. 1908-1915 (Addendum "E") that there was a willful,
malicious, and knowingly reckless disregard of the rights of
Nielson and an intentional disregard of the proclamations of the
Wildlife Board.

The trial court further found that the super-

visors of Gurley at the Division of Wildlife Resources ("DWR"
herein) knew or should have known of Gurley7s dislike for dog
training activities and should have disciplined Gurley prior to
the destruction of Nielson's pen, acknowledged and affirmatively
sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's misconduct.
and Conclusions, Addendum "F," % 13, R. 1949.)

(Findings

The trial court

therefore enjoined Gurley individually from such conduct.
(Findings ff 6-11, R. 1951-1949.)
Final judgment was entered on January 7, 1993 (R. 1955).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gurley's "statement of facts" bears no relationship to the
facts determined by the trial court or recited by this Court in
Nielson

v. Division

of POST, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah App., decided

April 20, 1993) ("Gurley I"), arid is not supported by a single
reference to the Record as required by Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of
2

Appellate Procedure.

This Court has recently held that "we draw

the facts from the trial court's findings and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom."

Sparrow v.

Tayco Construction

Co.,

P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah App., decided Feb. 4, 1993), citing
v.

Campbell,

699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

846
Kimball

Brief of Appellant

so far departs from that standard as to offend counsel's obligation of candor and make clear that it is calculated

to mislead.

The correct statement of the facts, with references to the
Record ("R" herein) and the findings of the trial judge as
required by Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
Sparrow,
A.

supra.,

Nielson's

is as follows:
Contract

Rights

Under his

Lease

and

Permit.

At all material times Nielson held a permit from DWR (R. 6)
and property rights under Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 (R.
12) with the State of Utah, Division of State Lands and Forestry,
in the subject lands situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, for
the specific purpose of "releasing and propagating gamebirds for
hunting dog training and conducting non-commercial competition of
hunting dogs."

(Verified Complaint %% 4-5, R. 21-22, Findings %%

2, 3, 8, 11, R. 1952, 1950, Memorandum Decision %% 2, 3, 10, 11,
R. 1915-1908.)
B.

Destruction

of Nielson's

Property

on September

8,

Nielson was known to Gurley since at least 1986.
R. 326.)

1990.
(Finding C,

Prior to the acts alleged, Gurley knew of the activities

of Nielson and other dog trainers on the subject lands, and had
openly expressed his hostility and dislike for their sport.

Gurley

also knew that his predetermined opinions were improper, that
3

persons engaged in the sport of dog training were fully authorized
by law to do so and that any attempts to complicate their activities were unlawful.

(Finding 1 15, R. 1948.)

Despite that knowledge, on September 8, 1990f Gurley forcefully and maliciously (see, e.g.,

Finding % 6, R. 1951) broke

into a locked pen belonging to Nielson containing a live Chukar
Partridge (a game bird), which was part of the licensed game farm,
released the bird, and took private property located therein
without the consent of the owner.

(Finding <| 1, R. 1952, Finding

B, R. 326.)
Gurley knew, or should have known, that the bird and the pen
were the property of Nielson and were used or could have been used
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training which had
been conducted at that location for a period of years.
2, R. 1952, Finding B, R. 326.)

(Finding %

If he did not already have that

knowledge, Gurley was informed by livestock men in the area on
that date that the pen belonged to Nielson and that Nielson was
staying in a camper behind the store in Vernon, a few miles away.
(Finding B, R. 32 6.) Facts clearly indicating Gurley's knowledge
included that the pen was on land Gurley knew was used for hunting
dog training by Nielson and others and that bands used for banding
live game birds when used for dog training were found by Gurley at
the site of the pen.
sides of the pen (viz.,

Gurley knew that recapture cones in the
wire funnel-shaped openings which permit

birds outside the pen to enter, but prevent birds from escaping)
were designed to recapture training birds without injury and that
the pen was proper for that purpose.
326, 325.)
4

(Findings B, D, E and F, R.

The trial court acknowledged that wild game could also enter a
lawful device such as the recapture pen, but found it to be a fact
that the game laws declare such inadvertent capture lawful if they
are released and Gurley himself had testified that no wild Chukar
Partridge were in the area of the pen or within a distance of
approximately five (5) miles.

(Finding K 5, R. 1951.)

The trial

court determined it to be a fact that Gurley acted with actual
malice (Finding f 6, R. 1951) , that he should not have so acted
and that his conduct was wrongful.
C.

Subsequent

Claims

(Finding f 9, R. 1950.)

of "Peace Officer9'

Statements at Br. 12-13, and passim,

Conduct.
that Gurley was a peace

officer on September 8, 1990 are misleading, for there was no
indication, at any time prior to initiation of this action that
Gurley acted in a peace officer capacity.
Nielson filed No. 302 on September 13, 1993 alleging no peace
officer conduct.

(Complaint, R. 22-14.)

Gurley answered the

complaint, asserting no defense based upon peace officer conduct,
(R. 36-31, 327-322) and further admitted on October 22, 1990 that
he made no arrest, including by issuance of any citation for any
alleged violation of law, at any time and obtained no warrant for
the search of the premises or seizure of any property therein.
(Answer to Request No. 7, R. 90.)
Nielson7s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, reserving as issues the elements of conversion and interference with contract, was granted by the Honorable David S. Young,
District Judge, on June 24, 1991.
asserted —

for the first time —
5

(R. 322.)

Thereafter Gurley

that he had acted in a peace

officer capacity in a motion to dismiss dated December 5, 1991.
(R. 821.)

Judge Moffat ordered Gurley's Affidavit asserting the

peace officer claim, which appears at R. 416, stricken because it
was not accompanied by the certification of his attorney required
by Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and further stated that
it was "riddled with untruths."

(R. 1536, Addendum "H.")

Judge

Young subsequently determined at the time of trial, after hearing
the evidence, that Gurley7s claims in that regard were based upon
false testimony and that he had intentionally conducted a bad
faith defense.

(Finding flf 17-18, R. 1947.)

The trial court took notice, in rejecting Gurley's claims of
peace officer conduct, that the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 2 3-2 0-15 and the Proclamation for Taking of Upland Game, declare
"it is unlawful for any person [including a peace officer],
without the consent of the owner or person in charge of any
privately owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy any . . .
enclosure"
per se,

and that Gurley had admitted that it is not illegal,

to own, possess or operate a bird pen equipped with

recapture devices, or to "take" any bird held in private ownership
lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen.

The trial court

also found that Gurley failed to follow Utah Administrative Code §
R608-4-3, which requires peace officers to "request persons . . .
to exhibit any documentation related to" possession of game
birds.

(Conclusion No. 5, R. 441.)

The facts admitted in

Gurley7s answers to interrogatories, including his investigative
reports (prepared after

this suit was filed, in an apparent

effort to clothe his acts with authority), established that Gurley
6

was familiar with the foregoing laws and regulations concerning
possession of live game birds.

(Findings ^

1951; Finding D through F, R. 326f 325.)

3 and 4, R. 1952,

The Memorandum Decision

therefore concluded that Gurley's conduct was not a proper
exercise of peace officer authority and was with malice toward dog
trainers as a group and Nielson in particular (R. 1908-1915).
D.

Compliance

With the Utah Governmental

Immunity

Act.

Representations at Br. 9 that "[p]rior to filing the second
action (viz.,

No. 249), plaintiff did not file a notice of claim

with the Division of Wildlife Resources and the Attorney General
of the State of Utah" pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act are untrue and advanced in disregard of the Record.

To the

contrary, Nielson promptly obtained an order fixing written
undertaking in No. 302 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-10 and
filed the undertaking contemplated for a suit against a peace
officer on December 9, 1991 (R. 841), a mere four (4) days after
Gurley's motion first raised the claim of peace officer conduct.
Nielson also moved to amended his complaint in No. 3 02 (R. 341) in
response to the newly asserted claim that Gurley acted in a peace
officer capacity.

By that date, notice of claim had been filed

with both DWR and the Attorney General five (5) separate
times.—'

Nielson also filed a new complaint in No. 249, after

Paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, a copy of which is at Appellant's Addendum p. 400401, alleged that notice of claim was "by certified mail on or about September 3, 1991 . . . on
three (3) separate occasions; first, by serving a proposed complaint . . . on the Attorney
General . . . and further serving a copy of said complaint on Gurley and Timothy H. Provan,
Director of the Division of Wildlife Resources, Gurley's employer, by certified mail . . .
second, on September 3, 1991, in connection with Plaintiff's Complaint before the Division of
Peace Officer Standards and Training [viz. , in Gurley I,, supra. ] . . . and third, as a matter of
caution, and anticipating that the Attorney General would contend that the first and second
notices were defective, a third notice, entitled "Notice of Claim Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-11(2)" was prepared and filed on December 4, 1991, a copy of which is attached hereto."
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filing notice of claim, adding a new claim for injunctive relief
(equitable claims being exempt from governmental immunity).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

This Court lacks jurisdiction, notice of appeal dated

February 26, 1993 not being within thirty (30) days after final
judgment on January 7, 1993 and no extension having been obtained.
Maverick

Country

Varian-Eimac,
II.

Stores

Inc.

v.

Industrial

v. Lamoreaux,

Commission,
infra.

Governmental immunity does not apply to conduct of state

employees not within their authority, Madsen v.
infra.
Id.,

claims arising out of contracts, Hansen v. Salt
infra.,

or equitable actions, American

of West Jordan,
III.

genuine
Inc.,

Borthick,

Notice of claim is not required as to acts of malice,

County,
City

infra.;

Tierra

Lake
Corp.

v.

infra.

Partial summary judgment was proper, there being no
issue of fact.

infra.

Robinson

v. Intermountain

Health

Care,

In the trial on the merits, no evidence contro-

verting Plaintiff's showing on conversion and interference with
contract was proffered.

No evidence was excluded and the find-

ings of the trial judge determined the elements of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS §§ 223 and 237. Appellant has failed to marshal

Footnote 1 continued
GurLey's Answer to the Amended Complaint which was verified, admitted that "the documents
referred to in paragraph 38 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint were filed on or about the dates
alleged by plaintiff . . . ." (R. 1725.) In addition, the Affidavit of Shauna Herrara at
Appellant's Addendum pp. 404-424 establishes that notice of claim was filed two (2) more times
on December 5, 1991, once in the form of a claim for return of property pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-24-2, and again in a form specifically denominated to be pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11(2).
To state as a fact that notice of claim was not filed "prior to filing the second action,"
in face of those matters in the Record is, we submit, the ultimate in excessive advocacy!
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evidence to the contrary, Sparrow
infra.,

v.

Tayco Construction

Co.,

and the decision of the trial court must be affirmed.

The trial court correctly held that the game bird law permits
the ownership and recapture of birds which are lawfully owned,
because they are not "wildlife."
IV.

Rule 11 order striking the Affidavit of Appellant, and

imposing sanctions, was within the discretion of the trial court.

Business
Inc.,

Guides,

infra.;
V.

Inc.

v. Chromatic Communications

Jeschke

v. Willis,

Enterprises.,

infra..

Sanctions should be imposed for continued bad faith

litigation, Schoney

v. Memorial

Estates,

Inc.,

infra.,

misrep-

resentation of the Record herein and failure of counsel to heed
his prior censure in Error

v. Western

Home Ins.

Co.,

infra..

A R G U M E N T
Gurley's main line of defense, viz.,

that he acted as a peace

officer with "probable cause," was rejected by the trial court
after a trial on the merits.

Gurley never asserted peace officer

conduct, in any event, until after
entered against him.

summary judgment had been

Had he done so, the trial court determined,

after hearing all of the evidence, including Gurley's own testimony, that "probable cause" did not authorize Gurley to "seize"
Nielson's bird pen (e.g.,
property therein.

Br. 30), much less destroy it and the

The trial court was correct, for this Court has

repeatedly held that conduct consistent with lawful behavior cannot
constitute "probable cause," e.g.,

State

v. Trujillo,

739 P.2d

85, 89-90 (Utah App. 1987) and subsequently held, emphatically, in
State

v. Beavers,

219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 39 (Utah App., decided
9

August 13, 1993) that "police cannot rely on reasonable suspicion
as the basis for a warrantless entry" and that "entry was
constitutionally impermissible even if probable cause existed,"
citing Coolidge

v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971) ("no

amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure").
There must be, in addition, "exigent circumstances" consisting of
imminent physical harm or destruction of evidence.
This Court cannot reach that question, however, for it is
clearly without jurisdiction.
Point I
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Notice of Appeal, a copy of which is attached at Addendum "B,"
was filed on February 26, 1993. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, requires that the notice of appeal be filed within
thirty (30) days following entry of final judgment.

The Notice was

thus untimely and jurisdictionally defective, having been filed
more than thirty (30) days after final judgment was entered on
January 7, 1993. No order enlarging the time for appeal had been
secured, nor had a timely post-trial motion extending the time for
appeal been filed.
A.

Appeal

may not be Taken From an Amended

Judgment.

Counsel for Gurley acknowledged in a letter to Geoffrey J.
Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, dated January 20, 1993,
that notice of appeal was necessary, but nevertheless failed to
appeal for another thirty-seven (37) days.

Appeal was then barred,

final judgment having been entered fifty-one (51) days earlier.
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Counsel indulges in calculated deception at Br. 12, in an
attempt to salvage jurisdiction, by stating that appeal was not
from the final judgment entered on January 7, 1993, but from the
Amended Judgment entered by the Court on January 27, 1993.

Further

lack of candor and deception is revealed in the assertion that
"[o]n January 21, 1993, defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment" and that "[o]n
January 27, 1993, the Court entered its Amended Judgment."

The

motion was without any effect, having been withdrawn (R. 2 069), and
could not delay the appeal time, in any event, for it was filed on
January 21 and was untimely, being more than ten (10) days after
final judgment entered on January 7.

See Rule 59, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
The amendment had no relation to Appellant's motion to set
aside, does not represent a "final judgment" and is not appealable.

The amended judgment merely corrected a clerical error in

which the word "costs," clearly awarded by the Memorandum Decision
dated December 18, 1992 (R. 1908), was omitted from the final
judgment entered on January 7, 1993. A copy of the Amended
Judgment is attached hereto at Addendum "C". Comparison of it with
the final judgment of January 7, attached at Addendum "D," will
reveal that they are identical, save for the addition of the word
"costs" in paragraph 6 on page 2.
Utah and other courts have ruled many times that such minor,
clerical corrections relate back to the date of entry of final
judgment.

E.g., Adamson v. Brockbank,

268 (1947):
11

112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264,

The rule of law enunciated by this court in these
cases, is that, where a belated entry merely
constitutes an amendment or modification not
changing the substance or character of the
judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc
entry which relates back to the time the original
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the
time for appeal . . . .
(Citations omitted.)
Accord., Federal
Co.,

Trade Com. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell

Regulator

344 U.S. 209 (1952) (fact that judgment has been re-entered

or revised in an immaterial way does not toll time for appeal).
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the
parties litigant.
(Utah 1979).

Salt

Lake City

Corp.

See also, In re Voorhees'

v. Layton,
Estate,

600 P.2d 538

12 Utah 2d 361,

366 P.2d 977 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court revisited the issue in recent
years and reaffirmed these precepts in Budinich
Dickinson

& Co.,

v.

Becton

486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988):

"A 'final decision' generally is one which ends
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment." A
question remaining to be decided after an order
ending litigation on the merits does not prevent
finality if its resolution will not alter or moot
or revise decisions embodied in the order.
(Citations omitted.)
Precise to the issues of this case, Becton

Dickinson

held that a

subsequent award of costs does not affect the finality of a
judgment.

The court reviewed authorities that costs, including

the award of attorney's fees, are not part of the merits of the
action and held that
This requires, we think, a uniform rule that an
unresolved issue of attorney's fees for the
litigation in question does not prevent judgment
on the merits from being final. 486 U.S. 202.
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A judgment nunc pro tunc
Utah State

Bldg.

P.2d 141 (1965).
cannot extend

cannot shorten

Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing

the time for appeal.

Co.,

16 Utah 2d 249, 399

Conversely, mere correction of a clerical error

the time for appeal.

Bach v. Caughlin,

508 F.2d

303 (7th Cir. 1974).
B.

Notice

of Appeal

is

Jurisdictional.

This Court might excuse an inartful designation of the Judgment
appealed from, but timeliness is jurisdictional.
Oakland

Scavenger

Co.,

Torres

v.

487 U.S. 312 (1988).

[A]lthough a court may construe the Rules
liberally in determining whether they have been
complied with, it may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, even for
"good cause shown," if it finds that they have
not been met. Id. at 316-217.
The issue is identical with Dickinson

v. Petroleum

Corp.,

338 U.S. 507 (1950), where the controversy was tried and a decree
entered on April 10, 1947. The trial court then determined rights
of class members and awarded costs in a "final decree" dated
August 3, 1948. Appeal from the latter decree was jurisdictionally defective:
We hold the decree of April 10, 1947, to have
been a final one as to Petroleum and one from
which it could have appealed and that its
failure to appeal therefrom forfeits its right
of review. Its attempt to review the earlier
decree by appealing from the latter one is
ineffective, and its appeal should be dismissed.
Id. at 516.
The file concerning this appeal leaves no doubt that Appellant's counsel was well aware of the need to file a notice of
appeal.

Appellant had ample time following his January 20 letter

to Mr. Butler to file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days
13

after January 7, 1993, as required by Rule 4, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, or to obtain an extension of time if that was
appropriate or necessary, but did not do so.
This Court cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal.
Nelson

v. Stoker,

City,

669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1993); Bowen v.

565 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Burgers

1320 (1982).

v. Maiben,

Riverton

652 P.2d

"Regardless of who raises the issue, we must dismiss

a case if we determine we do not have jurisdiction."
Country

Stores

v. Industrial

Commission,

221 Utah Adv. Rep. 17,

18 (Utah App., decided Sept. 7, 1993), citing Silva
of Employment

Sec,

v.

743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)

"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction

it retains only the authority to dismiss the action."
Eimac,
C.

Inc.

Department

786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990) (per cu-

riam); Thompson v. Jackson,
(per curiam).

Maverick

v. Lamoreaux,

The Premature

Notice

Varian-

767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989).
was

Defective.

It is acknowledged at Br. 12 that notice of Appeal was filed,
prematurely, on December 21, 1992, from the Memorandum Decision of
Judge Young.

(R. 1934.)

Appellant advised the Clerk of the Utah

Supreme Court by letter dated January 20, 1993 that "final
judgment has not been entered" and that "a new notice of appeal
2/
/
[may] need to be filed."—
No docketing statement was ever

The premature notice explicitly relates to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young dated
December 18, 1992, and orders preceding it, and does not relate to any orders thereafter:
Notice is hereby given that the defendant and appellant Dale Gurley . . .
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable David
S. Young entered in this matter on December 18, 1992.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on December 18, 1992,
as well as from all prior judgments . . . .
(Emphasis added.)

14

f i l e d pursuant t o t h e Premature Notice and both t h e Docketing
Statement h e r e i n and A p p e l l a n t ' s Addendum l e a v e no doubt t h a t t h e
premature n o t i c e has been abandoned (viz.,

only t h e February 26,

1993 N o t i c e of Appeal i s included a t A p p e l l a n t ' s Addendum 2 5 ) .
The premature n o t i c e f i l e d on December 2 1 , 1992 i s d e f e c t i v e ,
in any e v e n t , under Rule 3 ( d ) , Utah Rules of A p p e l l a t e Procedure,
for two r e a s o n s .

F i r s t , Gurley purported t o appeal from a non-

appealable Memorandum D e c i s i o n .
a motion for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

Second, Gurley subsequently

filed

Rule 4 ( b ) , Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, c a t e g o r i c a l l y d e c l a r e s t h a t a n o t i c e of appeal

filed

p r i o r t o a motion t o r e c o n s i d e r " s h a l l have no e f f e c t " and "a new
n o t i c e of appeal must be f i l e d . "
Point I I
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
WAS COMPLIED WITH
Gurley m i s s t a t e s , or misunderstands, t h e concept of governmental immunity with h i s a s s e r t i o n s t h a t "timely f i l i n g of a
n o t i c e of claim i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n [ a l ] p r e r e q u i s i t e t o i n s t i t u t i n g
l e g a l a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Utah or one of i t s employees"

Footnote 2 continued
Arguments of Gurley in his opposition to the motion to dismiss appeal before the Supreme Court
that Rule 4(c) provides that premature notice takes effect on entry of the final order are
incorrect. Rule 4(c) applies when the correct order is appealed from, but notice is filed
before the order is entered.
The Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992 was not a "final judgment." Judge Young's
Minute Entry entered simultaneously with the Memorandum Decision (R. 1907) directed that "the
Plaintiff is requested to prepare consistent with the Memorandum Decision and the Record, formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment." Plaintiff did so, and final judgment was
entered on January 7, 1993. There can be no doubt that a Memorandum Decision, leaving the
formal entry of the form of judgment to be resolved, is not a "final order." A proceeding is
not "final" until a judgment or order is entered ending the controversy. Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). Cf. , Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App.
1989). Accord, Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542
(Utah App. 1992). Premature notice of appeal is ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction.
DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah App., March 18, 1992)
(notice of appeal filed before disposition of a post-judgment motion). The remedy for appeal
from a proceeding which is not final is dismissal. A.J. Mackey Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817
P.2d 323 (Utah 1991).
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(Br. 19) and that "Defendant is Immune from Suit."
Neither proposition could be correct.

(Id. 22.)

State employees, like

other citizens, finance homes, automobiles and other transactions,
and are involved in automobile accidents and other torts, for
which they, like other persons, may be subject to suit.

They, and

the State of Utah, like ordinary citizens, contract for
construction, facilities and supplies, and they may be sued to
enforce their bargain.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1
et seq.,

accommodates those obvious requirements by permitting

suit against an employee for conduct not in "the performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority."

E.g.,

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12. Wanton destruc-

tion of private property is not in the performance of duties or
under color of authority, and the trial judge so held.

Urging

that Utah Admin. Code § R 608-11-3(C)(2) requires peace officers
to "seize" illegal trapping devices is insufficient to satisfy the
"color of authority" element, for the pen was not "illegal," Utah
Admin. Code § R608-4-3 requires peace officers to make inquiry and
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(1) requires DWR officers to follow "the
same procedures as other peace officers." Repeated decisions of
this Court impose a "warrants wherever possible" requirement.
E.g.,

State

v. Sims,

808 P.2d 141, 148 (Utah App. 1991).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 further provides that immunity from
suit is waived as to any action "arising out of contractual rights
or obligations." Nielson's claims arise out of not one, but two,
contracts consisting of his lease with the State of Utah and his
16

permit for a private wildlife farm.

Said § 63-30-5 pointedly

declares that such claims "shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15
or 63-30-19" —

which is a litany for filing a notice of claim.

Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) specifically declares
that the Governmental Immunity act does not apply if "the employee
acted or failed to act through fraud or malice." Malice, in other
words, is not something the State is liable for because it is not
within the scope of an employee's duties or within the course of
his employment and therefore not "under color of authority."

Two

separate judges have found Gurley's conduct the product of actual
malice, in three (3) separate orders.
Furthermore, the defense is precluded by the order enjoining
Gurley in No. 249 because of the plain holding in American
Corp.

v.

City

of West Jordan,

Tierra

840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah, 1992) that

the Governmental Immunity Act has no application to equitable
claims.
Madsen

II),

v.

Borthick,

769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)

is thus miscited at Br. 19. Borthick

(Borthick

II plainly did not

hold that "timely notice of claim is a jurisdiction[al] prerequisite to instituting legal action against the State of Utah or one
of its employees."

To the contrary, Justice Zimmerman categor-

ically held at 769 P.2d 251 that
The Commissioners' argument [viz.,
that "in
all suits against employees" the requirement of
a notice of claim is a precondition to suit]
runs directly counter to section 63-30-11's
apparently plain statement to the opposite
effect: "[S]ervice of the notice of claim upon
the governmental entity is required only if
17

the entity has a statutory duty to indemnify
such person.1'
Justice Zimmerman further observed at 769 P.2d 249n.6 that Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 "also carries the negative implication . . .
that service of notice on an employee 'is not a condition precedent to the commencement of an action . . . against such person.'"
Filing of notice of claim is therefore not a subject matter objection, even where required, and failure of Gurley to assert the
defense prior to the entry of summary judgment constitutes a waiver.
Watkiss

& Campbell

Borthick

II

v. Foa & Son,

808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).

is clearly distinguishable.

It involved the

question of whether allegations of "gross negligence" avoid the
notice of claim requirement, following a 1983 amendment eliminating "gross negligence" from Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp.
1979) . It has nothing to say —

nothing at all —

about the clear

exemption of acts involving "malice" or claims arising out of
contracts from the provisions of said Section 11.
Borthick

II

reaffirmed and relied upon Madsen v.

658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (Borthick

I),

Borthick,

which held at 630n.5 and

63 3 that the Governmental Immunity Act grants "permission to sue
government employees for 'gross negligence, fraud or malice.'"
Thus Borthick

without

I and II both hold that an employee may be sued,

the necessity

of filing

a notice

circumstances permitted by the act.
Hansen v. Salt

Lake County,

of claim,

in those

If there could be any doubt,

794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) (contract

action) held, contrary to Gurley's contention, that "the immunity
is not absolute" because "the Act was structured such that immu-
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nity was granted

generally

and waived

exception to waiver) specifically."

(and retained by
(Emphasis by the Court.)

There plainly is no absolute obligation to file a notice of
claim merely because Gurley is a government employee.

Even if this

Court were to conclude that notice of claim was necessary, such
notice had been served on the Attorney General and DWR five (5)
separate times by the time No. 249 was filed.

(See note 1,

supra.)

The Governmental Immunity Act prescribes no form for the

notice.

The Complaint in No. 302 included all of the elements

required for a notice and was served on both the Attorney General
and DWR.

They could have been afforded no better "notice," when

No. 249 was filed, than the actual complaint that was to be filed.
Point III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CONTROVERTING THE
TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS AND THEY MUST BE AFFIRMED
Br. 25 through 40 resorts to a "scattergun," (if we may be
indulged a pun) assault on the findings and conclusions of the
trial judge, reminiscent of the rural adage that "if you throw
enough [bleep] at 'em, some of it'll stick"!

This Court need not

pause over Gurley7s attack on the findings of the trial judge,
however —
—

and, indeed, has not been given any basis for doing so

for counsel has not furnished a single reference to the Record

in support of his arguments.
The evidence was clear, and uncontroverted that Nielson
purchased the Chukar in the pen, and others in the vicinity which
were being controlled by its "recall" features, from a licensed
game farm the prior day.

(See R. 21-22 and testimony of Derreld
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Morris, who sold the birds to Nielson.)

The trial judge repeat-

edly found, in his Partial Summary Judgment at R. 326, in his
Memorandum Decision at R. 1915 and in his Findings and Conclusions
at R. 1952 that the subject device was not a "trap," but a bird
pen.

(Derreld Morris, who operates a commercial game farm, so

testified.)
Gurley,s present counsel, Mr. Ferguson, is hard pressed to
suggest anything incorrect about the trial judge's findings and
conclusions in that regard, for they were in fact agreed to by
Gurley's former counsel, Assistant Attorney General Stringham, who
conceded during the summary judgment hearing before Judge Young
that the recall pen was legal.
JUDGE YOUNG: Now, would you take the position
that they then have to buy birds every time they
train because they have no ability to recapture
the birds that they're using?
MR. STRINGHAM:
point on that.

Well—and I can see the Court's

JUDGE YOUNG: Well, [Gurley's contention] becomes
absurd, doesn't it?
MR. STRINGHAM:

Yes, it does.

JUDGE YOUNG: So [if training dogs is legal] they
must have the right to maintain a recapture pen.
MR. STRINGHAM:

Fair enough.
*

*

*

*

JUDGE YOUNG: In other words, it is not unlawful
for Mr. Nielson to have had this pen for recapture, with recapture cones, for the purpose of
recapturing the bird he was using.
MR. STRINGHAM: For the purpose of recapturing, I
believe that's proper.
JUDGE YOUNG:

Then Mr. Nielson's motion for
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summary judgment on that issue is granted. (See
transcript of oral arguments on all outstanding
motions on May 28, 1991 at 9-10, reproduced at
Appellant's Addendum 144-145.)
Judge Young then gave articulation to his rationale for holding that Gurley did not act under "color of authority" at Tr. 12:
JUDGE YOUNG: I can't understand in this case
why Mr. Gurley didn't make further inquiry. To
me, it seems obvious that this was a pen on
property that he knew, or should have known, was
being used for training dogs. He apparently
knew Mr. Nielson. I'm a little surprised that
he did not make further inquiry on this.
Positively offensive, coming from a veteran member of the Bar
like Mr. Ferguson and in light of the foregoing, is his resort to
unfairly maligning the distinguished trial judge at Br. 29n.3
where it is stated that "the court declined to elaborate on its
reasons" and at 46n.7 where it is stated that
the trial court never ruled on the substance of
the legal defenses and motions presented by
defendant. Defendant was never able to get the
court to rule on his Motion to Dismiss. The
court refused to consider defendant's motions for
summary judgment and Motion to Set Aside or
Vacate the Partial Summary Judgment on the basis
that defendant had "waived" these defenses.
Watkiss

& Campbell

v. Foa & Son,

supra.,

does in fact hold that

defenses not raised prior to entry of summary judgment are waived,
but the accusation is nevertheless incorrect.

The Order on the

Parties Pretrial Motions dated August 13, 1992 (R. 1706) ruled on
the merits of each of Gurley's motions.

Indeed, the transcript of

hearings before Judge Young on May 28, 1991, quoted supra.,

and

August 6, 1992, contained in Appellant's own Addendum at 54-93 and
138-165, both reveal that Judge Young patiently elaborated his
reasons and ruled upon each of Gurley's motions:
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JUDGE YOUNG: . . . . Maybe it would be wise for
us to go through those motions [of Gurley] and
see what the court would do with each one of them.
*

*

*

*

MR. FERGUSON: Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed in case 302. Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in—it is
denied but it was filed in 249.
JUDGE YOUNG:

Okay.
*

*

Each of those will be denied.
*

*

MR. FERGUSON: There was a Motion for Relief From
Partial Summary Judgment filed in 3 02.
*

*

*

*

JUDGE YOUNG: All right (after hearing counsel).
I will allow that to stand, Mr. Ferguson.
*

*

*

*

MR. FERGUSON: The Motion to Stay Execution was
the other one. The motion for relief from Judge
Moffat's order.
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. That motion will be
denied for relief from Judge Moffat's order. . . .
*

*

*

*

MR. FERGUSON: And the final motion that I have
filed is the Motion for Return of Garnished Funds
based upon the filing of the bond.
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. That motion will be
denied. . . . Now, anything else?
MR. FERGUSON: Those are all the motions that I
filed. (Transcript of Hearing on Outstanding
Motions, August 6, 1992 at 90-96, reproduced at
Appellant's Addendum at 75-81.)
Gurley's present counsel now advances at Br. 25-35 the very
arguments Gurley's former counsel, Mr. Stringham, acknowledged
were
A.

"absurd".
Summary Judgment was Properly

Entered.

Arguments at Br. 26-30 and 32-35 concerning the entry of
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Partial Summary Judgment are incorrect and ask this Court to
ignore the modern view of summary judgment proceedings.
1.

Entry

of Two Forms of Order was Proper.

First of all,

there was nothing irregular or improper about Judge Young entering
two orders, or any other number he found necessary and proper.
Gurley correctly notes that Judge Young was frustrated.

His

frustration grew out of the refusal of counsel for Gurley to agree
on the form of an order, as the trial court had directed.

Rather

than do so, counsel for Gurley submitted a competing form of order
in disregard of the clear provisions of Rule 4-504(1), Utah Code
of Judicial Administration, that "counsel for the party or parties
obtaining the ruling" shall submit the "proposed form of order."
There being no inconsistency between the two forms of order (and
counsel for Gurley suggests none), Judge Young ended the bickering
by signing both orders.

We submit that was a proper exercise of

judicial discretion and an inspired way to deal with uncooperative
counsel.
2.
Judgment

The Trial

Court Followed

Procedure.

the Modern View of Summary

Rule 56(c) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides:
(c) Motion and Proceedings
Thereon.
. ..
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. . . .
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated
on Motion.
If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
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at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including
the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are
just. . . .
Contrary to urging of Gurley that a summary judgment must be
based upon "evidence," Rule 56 requires only a "showing" which may
be by affidavit, by interrogating counsel or by any other matter
in the file.

Frisbee

v. K & K Construction

Co.,

676 P.2d 387,

390 (Utah 1984) held "that an opponent of a motion for summary
judgment must timely file responsive affidavits raising factual
issues or risk the trial court's conclusion that there are no
factual issues."
The United States Supreme Court issued a trilogy of opinions
in 1986, rejecting arguments that summary judgment must be based
on "evidence" and giving the identical provisions of federal Rule
56 expansive meaning in cases where there is no genuine
a material
Zenith

fact.

Radio Corp.

Catrett,

See,

477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson

Industrial

Robinson

v.

v. Liberty

Intermountain

Co.

Corp.

Health

See also,

Busch v. State

Farm Fire

and

v.

v.

Lobby,

740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) adopted both Liberty

and Celotex.
Co.,

Electric

106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986), Celotex

477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Inc.,

Matsushita

issue of

Inc.,
Care,
Lobby,

Casualty

743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987).
In Celotex

the High Court declared that "[w]e do not mean
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that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that
would be admissible at trial" (477 U.S. at 324) and pointedly held
in Liberty

Lobby that
[WJhen a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party "must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." And, as we noted
above, Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge
shall then grant summary judgment if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. There is no requirement that the trial
judge make findings of fact. (Citations omitted)
477 U.S. 250.

Accord.,

Lujan v. National

3186 (1990).

Wildlife

Federation,

110 S.Ct. 3177,

As Chief Justice Rhenquist held in

Celotex:

One of the principal purposes of the summary
judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims or defenses, and
we think it should be interpreted in a way
that allows it to accomplish this purpose.
477 U.S. at 323-324.
As Judge Greene observed in Jane L. v. Bangerter,

794 F.Supp.

1537, 1540 (D. Utah 1992):
Hearing and viewing the witnesses subject to
cross-examination would not aid the determination if there are neither issues of credibility nor controversies with respect to the
substance of the proposed testimony. The
judge, as trier of fact, is in a position to
and ought to draw his inferences without resort
to the expense of trial.
3.

Finding

Summary Judgment.

Facts

Without

Genuine Dispute

is

the Function

of

Gurley's efforts to suggest impropriety in

the entry of Partial Summary Judgment at Br. 26-30 are both
duplicitous and contradictory.
First, Gurley correctly states at Br. 28 that "the trial court
has an obligation to clearly set forth the basis for its ruling
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granting summary judgment," but then proceeds to argue that the
trial judge erred because he did precisely that.
is not Rule 52(a), but Rule 56(d), supra,

The correct rule

directing that the

trial judge "make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy . . . and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just . . . ." The order proposed
by Gurley's counsel correctly recited some legal issues that had
been ruled upon, but did not define
remaining.

the facts

and

issues

It could not be error, therefore, for the trial judge

to enter, simultaneously, the order submitted by the prevailing
party which did define the factual issues resolved and those
remaining for trial.
It is incorrectly stated that the trial court erred by making
findings of fact, for Rule 56 directs that he do so when they are
without genuine

controversy.

Gurley at Br. 32-33 —

viz.,

The two findings objected to by
that Gurley had reason to believe

that the pen belonged to Nielson on September 8, 1990, and was
familiar with the laws and regulations concerning possession of
game birds —

are without genuine controversy because they come

directly out of Gurley7s own report attached to his Affidavit.
(R. 416.)

They were, moreover, admitted on interrogation of his

counsel (see supra.,
by Rule 56.

p. 20) at the time of hearing, as directed

It cannot be argued, with any logic or consistency,

that the trial judge could not conclude that those facts were
without genuine controversy.
Judge Young did not conclude "that Officer Gurley did not like
dog trainers [and] . . . that Officer Gurley had acted mali26

ciously," (Br. 33-34), at least not in his summary judgment.
Those findings came later, in the trial on the merits.

The

summary judgment merely recited that there was an "inference" of
malice, and made no such conclusion.
4.

Trial

was not Limited

to Damages.

Finally, the trial

court did not "conclude that the Partial Summary Judgment found
liability against defendant as a matter of law" (Br. 36) or
"restrict the ability of defendant to present factual defenses"
concerning interference with contract rights and conversion.
39.)

(Br.

The competing order presented by Gurley's counsel would have

put the trial judge in that box, and may have been calculated to
do so, but the order on Partial Summary Judgment is clear:
8. The issues remaining for trial, within
the meaning and intent of Rule 56(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, include the question
of damages or other appropriate relief, including the extent and nature of any defamatory
statements concerning Plaintiff made by
Defendant, and the elements of conversion,
interference with contract rights and defamation (but not including the defense of truth of
any statements that Plaintiff violated the
law), respectively. (R. 322-323.)
B.

The Elements of Conversion
were
Established.

and Interference

with

Contract

In the eventual trial, the trial court found, at R. 1946:
5. The court determines that the facts establish the elements of conversion.
6. The court determines that the facts establish the elements of interference with a
contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease
agreement with the State of Utah.
It is incorrectly stated, therefore, that the trial court
"restricted the ability of defendant to present factual defenses."
(Br. 39.)

To the contrary, no proof was ever proffered by Gurley
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rebutting the showing made in support of summary judgment.
Failing such a proffer, Nielson's showing was uncontroverted.
The trial judge correctly applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§ 223 as to the elements of conversion:
A conversion may be committed by intentionally
(a) dispossessing another of a chattel as
stated in §§ 221 and 222;
(b) destroying or altering a chattel as
stated in § 226
*

*

*

*

(g) refusing to surrender a chattel as stated
in §§ 237-241.
The facts establish conversion of all three of the foregoing
types.
There can be no doubt that Gurley's "dismantling" of
Plaintiffs pen destroyed it, or altered it within the meaning of
RESTATEMENT § 226.
purpose

Indeed, Gurley stated in his report that his

was to render it inoperative.

There is no need for

Gurley to put the property to his own use, for his refusal to
return it for more than one year amounts to a conversion.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 237:
One in possession of a chattel as bailee or
otherwise who, on demand, refuses without
proper qualification to surrender it to another
entitled to its immediate possession, is
subject to liability for conversion.
Comment g to § 237 explains that a defendant who "puts the
plaintiff to the necessity of a lawsuit to recover his property,
is clearly [guilty of] a conversion."
The trial judge correctly applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §
766B as to interference with contract:
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One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with another's prospective contractual relation
(except a contract to marry) is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm
resulting from loss of the benefits of the
relation, [if] the interference consists of
*

*

*

*

(b) preventing the other from acquiring or
continuing the prospective relation.
There is no authority for the assertion "that it is
impossible for one agent of the State of Utah to commit the tort
of intentional interference between Plaintiff and the State of
Utah."

(Br. 39.)

Gurley was not even employed by the Division

of Lands and Forestry, with whom Nielson contracted.

Being an

employee of DWR does not make Gurley "a party to a contract"
(Id.

40) between Nielson and Gurley7s employer.

Does Mr.

Ferguson mean, really, that Nielson could sue the Clerk of this
Court, who is also a state employee, for specific performance of
the lease agreement?

Nielson

v. Jacobsen,

699 P.2d 1207 (Utah

1983) (Br. 40) has nothing to say about such matters.
C.

No Evidence

was Excluded

at

Trial.

Urging at Br. 39 that the trial judge excluded relevant
evidence at the time of trial is also incorrect.

Judge Young

explained in the dialogue quoted at Br. 36-37 the findings on
summary judgment that must be overcome, but Gurley never proffered any evidence calculated to do so.

There is no suggestion

of any evidence that was excluded other than the claim at Br. 39
that Judge Young did not "wish to have further testimony" about
whether the pen was on Nielson's leased land.

That comment

merely reflected the trial judge's observation that, because the
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surrounding land was p u b l i c , i t would make no d i f f e r e n c e i f t h a t
were s o .

(See Judge Young's comments quoted a t Br. 38.)

J. Russel Manning, who Gurley quotes a t Br. 37, was i n f a c t
allowed t o t e s t i f y .

His testimony stands for nothing, however,

for t h e foundation w i t n e s s , Forest O f f i c e r Dave G r i f f e l , was
forced t o admit t h a t t h e r e was no bird pen a t t h e s i t e he asked
Manning t o survey.
G r i f f e l ' s assumption

Nielson t e s t i f i e d

(see % 29 a t R. 1832) t h a t

of t h e p e n ' s l o c a t i o n was on t h e wrong

s i d e of Forest Road 601, more than 1,000 f e e t from i t s c o r r e c t
3/
location.— 7

I t had been removed, moreover, many months p r i o r

t o t h e Manning survey by N i e l s o n , with the h e l p of Mr. Don Burgi
(former Chief Deputy Clerk, Third D i s t r i c t Court).

(Id.)

Manning's c e r t i f i c a t i o n t h a t he surveyed a "structure" (which
he never i d e n t i f i e d as a bird pen) " i d e n t i f i e d for me by Dave
G r i f f e l " ( s e e A p p e l l a n t ' s Addendum 508) was p o i n t l e s s and Judge
Young t h e r e f o r e s a i d he did not wish t o hear more of i t .
D. Appellant
has not Marshaled the Evidence
Concerning
"Malice".
Gurley's arguments, t h o s e a g a i n s t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding

The undisputed testimony was that the pen was located near Stepladder Trough, correctly
shown on Defendant's Exhibit 11, reproduced at Appellant's Addendum p. 515 and to the east of
forest road #601. The forest map reproduced at Appellant's Addendum p. 495 did not go into
evidence, but is important because it shows that Griffel assumed that the pen was far from
Stepladder Trough and to the west of Forest Road #601. Thus, Griffel, who "identified" the site
for Manning (see Appellant's Addendum p. 508), erroneously located it by more than 1,000 feet.
The testimony quoted at Brief of Appellant 37 acknowledges that Manning merely fixed the "site
. . . identified by Dave Griffel" on topographic maps and ariel photography. He "did not use
scientific instruments or anything of that nature" (viz, surveying equipment) and if the site
he located was 700 feet from the nearest corner of the state lands (see Appellant's Addendum p.
508) it proves that it was actually on state land leased by Nielson.
The issue is a "red herring," in any event, for Griffel testified that there was nothing
improper about the pen being on forest land, even if that were so. Trappers regularly put their
devices on forest land, and need no permit to do so. Nielson had the consent of the forest
ranger when he originally put it where he did and promptly removed the pen, when requested to do
so (see WI 22, 28-29 at R. 1833, 1832, 1834).
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of malice in particular, disregard Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and his duty to marshal the evidence.
The trial court had before it the sworn statement of Deputy
Sheriff Dan Taylor, a fellow peace officer to whom Gurley
admitted his malice (R. 50) and Br. 47 acknowledges that Nielson
presented "testimony from [7] witnesses claiming to have reason
to believe that Officer Gurley dislike[d] dog trainers" and
"letters written by others at the Division of Wildlife Resources
which he used to argue that Gurley had personal malice."

Not a

single word of that evidence is presented in either Brief of
Appellant or Appellant's Addendum.

Neither does Gurley offer a

single word of evidence to the contrary, relying instead on his
own bland denial.

For that matter, there is not a single

reference, in the entirety of Brief of Appellant or Appellant's
Addendum to the Record and no reason is offered why the trial
judge could not believe those who testified to Gurley's malice
and disbelieve his self-serving denial.
An Appellant who challenges the trial court's findings of
fact must marshal the evidence.
Construction

Co.,

E.g.,

Sparrow

v.

Tayco

846 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App., decided Feb.

4, 1993):
. . . [I]n challenging the court's findings
regarding the parties' intent, Tayco must marshal
the evidence supporting these findings and then
show how the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are legally insufficient to
support the findings. . . .
Here, the court relied on substantial
evidence to support its findings . . . . Because
Tayco has not marshaled the evidence and because
the court relied on substantial evidence, we
affirm the court's finding . . . .
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See also, State

v. Gray,

851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App., decided

April 22, 1993):
. . . . it is well settled that in order to
"raise a challenge based on insufficiency of the
evidence, the appellant must marshal all evidence
supporting the trial court's conclusion. Then
the appellant must show how the marshaled evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is legally insufficient to support the
trial court's conclusion." If the appellant
fails to do so, we assume the trial court's
findings are adequately supported by the record.
In the case at bar, not only does Gray fail
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's denial of her motion to dismiss, but she
does not even marshal the evidence in opposition
to it, instead simply rearguing her motion to
dismiss without any reference to the record in
this case. Such is plainly insufficient to meet
our marshaling requirements. . . . Accordingly,
Gray's argument that the trial court improperly
denied her motion to dismiss fails. (Citations
omitted.)
It is not for Nielson to marshal the testimony of, e.g.,
Michael Hansing (Tr. 156), who testified that Gurley threatened
that he would use his authority to prevent dog training, or game
biologist William Galster (Tr. 126), to whom Gurley vowed that he
would prevent dog trials in the Vernon area.

Gurley must marshal

that evidence and explain why it does not support the findings.
E.

The Gurley

Affidavit

may not be Relied

Upon.

There was no proper basis in the Record, surely not at the
time of summary judgment, for Gurley's claims of peace officer
conduct, his claims that the device was a "trap," or that the bird
therein was wild.
at, e.g.,

The only support offered for those statements

Br. 18, 31, 33, 41, 42 and 47 is the Affidavit of

Gurley . Reference to the Gurley Affidavit is improper, however,
for Judge Moffat ordered it stricken.
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Mr. Ferguson and his predecessors never furnished a new
affidavit or other showing, properly certified as required by Rule
11.

The reason is obvious: Mr. Ferguson and his predecessors

knew that the Affidavit was a pack of falsehoods, as Judge Moffat
concluded, and to certify it would subject them, personally, to
the sanctions of Rule 11.

(See Point IV,

infra.)

The Court's attention is invited to the fact that the
Affidavit of Dale Gurley at Appellant's Addendum 516 is not the
Gurley Affidavit at R. 416 but a copy of a document filed before
Judge Greene in the United States District Court.

It was referred

to at the time of trial in aid to Gurley's testimony but was not
before the trial judge in connection with summary judgment or the
subsequent motion to set aside the summary judgment.

Thus,

summary judgment and subsequent motions are without any showing,
of any description, supporting Gurley's defense.
F.

Gurley

Misreads

Utah's

Game Bird

Law.

Contrary to the urging of Gurley at Br. 3 0-32 that the bird
pen was a "trap," that it had any "incriminating character"
related to "protected wildlife" or that "exigent circumstances"
required its destruction, the trial court recognized, correctly,
that the trapping regulations relate only to fur bearing animals
and that an entirely different statutory scheme governs game
birds.

(See Conclusion 2, R. 1947; Conclusions 2-5, R. 323, 324,

325.)

Gurley's argument is fundamentally flawed for at least five

(5) basic reasons.
First, Privately Owned Game Birds are not "Protected."

The

game bird code plainly permits private ownership of birds acquired
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from a legal source (viz.,

a game farm).

Utah Code Ann.

§ 23-17-2 provides:
It is unlawful for any person to take any birds
not held in private
ownership legally
acquired . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The testimony of Derreld Morris established that Nielson purchased
the bird the day before.

The Proclamation for the Possession of

Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § R608-4-3, reproduced
at Addendum "A," allows their possession pursuant to a permit
(which Nielson's Affidavit f 20, R. 1835 established that he had)
and further provides:
A certificate of registration IS NOT required
for a person to acquire live game birds for the
purpose of training dogs . . . provided the
birds are banded, are not held for more than 60
days, and a bill of sale from a legal source is
in possession. (Emphasis in original.)
Representations at, e.g., Br. 13-14, 31 that Gurley had any
belief that the pen, or the bird within it, had any incriminating
character are absurd (as the trial judge observed, and Mr.
Stringham agreed) when considered with the foregoing regulation.
With knowledge that dog training with live game birds was legal
and in progress on the subject lands, Gurley confiscated bands
clearly marked "dog trial."
Second, Pen Raised Birds are not "Wildlife.m

"Wildlife" is

defined at Utah Code. Ann. § 23-13-2(39) as "any species of
vertebrate animal life except
in a state

of nature."

feral

animals

generally

living

(Emphasis added.)

Under any view of the facts, the bird in the pen, acquired
the previous day from a licensed game farm, was not "living in a
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state of nature" and could not, therefore, be "wildlife."

Its

owner could therefore "take" it under the laws and regulations
relating to game birds, including by killing and eating it (as
suppliers of commercial restaurants do) or by "trapping," as game
farms do when they catch one for sale.

If that were not so, the

operation of a zoo or aviary would be impossible.

Moreover,

birds outside of the pen which had also been purchased were
either "possessed" pursuant to the Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § R608-4, by
virtue of their being controlled by the recall pen, or they had
"escaped" and thus "reverted to the wild," in which event they
are "feral."

In either event, they are not "protected wildlife"

and are subject to recapture.
Third, the Trapping Regulations Relate Only to Fur Bearing
Animals.

Urging at Br. 30 that "[t]raps and other trapping

devices used in taking any wildlife must be permanently marked or
tagged with the registered number of the trapper using them"
ignores that the trapping provisions at Utah Code Ann. § 23-18-1,
et seg.,

apply only to "wildlife" and to "furbearers." Game

birds are governed by entirely different provisions at Utah Code
Ann. § 23-17-4, et

seg.

Obviously, any device could be a "trap" if, but only if, so
used.

A deer fence surrounding a rancher's haystack clearly

could be a trap, if used to keep wild animals in, but is merely a
fence when used to keep them out.

So too with game birds. Utah

Admin. Code § R608-4-2(7), reproduced at Addendum "A," defines a
"private wildlife farm or aviculture installation" as "[a]n
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enclosed place such as, but not limited to, a pen or aviary, where
privately-owned game birds are propagated or kept and
restricts
added.)

the birds

from escaping

into the wild."

Nothing prohibits allowing them to return

which

(Emphasis
to the

pen.

Gurley's argument, if it were adopted by this Court, would mean
that Tracy Aviary could not recapture its pheasants when they get
out of their pen and mingle with ducks at the pond and Hogle Zoo
could not reclaim its wild turkeys when they fly over the fence.
Recall pens, which allow privately-owned birds to reenter, but
restricts their escape,

are thus plainly "aviculture
4/ The trial court correctly
installations" and not "traps."—'

recognized and applied that distinction.
Fourth, Utah Law Declares it Lawful to Recall Game Birds
Lawfully Owned.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2 (37) plainly provides

that "trapping" means "taking protected wildlife" and subdivision
(35), defines "taking" as meaning, inter

alia,

to "trap."

Nielson's pen was operated pursuant to a lease and private game
farm permit.

Thus the declaration at Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2

that it is not illegal to "take" birds "held in private ownership
legally acquired" means, necessarily, that it is not illegal to
"trap" privately owned game birds, acquired from a lawful source.
Fifth, Accidential Trapping is Legal.

Even if the trapping

regulations governing furbearers could be considered as having any

The argument at Brief of Appellant that the pen was "indiscriminate in what
was capable of trapping" and "capable of trapping not only chukars but any other
happened to enter it" is incorrect because it ignores the facts of nature. Only
same covey as the bird in the pen would be attracted to it and enter through the
cones." That is the purpose for leaving one "call bird" in the pen.
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animals it
wildlife that
birds of the
"recall

application, they plainly provide at Utah Admin. Code § R608-113(C)(4) that "accidental trapping" is not illegal if the trapped
animal is promptly released.

Gurley's counsel fails to advise

this Court of that provision and, contrary to his arguments
advanced elsewhere, nothing limits it to "registered" trapping
devices.
The "trapping" pejorative, which is Gurley's only line of
defense, is thus a mere "red herring."

The key to application of

the Utah Fish and Game Code, including the seizure provision at
Utah Code Ann § 23-20-1(3), is the term "wildlife."

One is not a

"trapper" unless he is taking "protected wildlife."
Point IV
GURLEY#S "PERJURY" WAS PROPERLY STRICKEN
It is correctly stated at Br. 41 that Judge Moffat ordered
Gurley's Affidavit stricken, in its entirety.

Incorrect, however,

are assertions that it was stricken because it was perjury
(although Judge Moffat did so conclude) or that Judge Moffat
awarded "attorneys' fees."

The Affidavit was stricken because

counsel could not represent it to be in good faith, following
reasonable investigation, as required by Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rule 11" herein).
Rule 11 was amended in 1985 to add to the former requirement
that every "pleading" be signed by an attorney of record, a requirement that every "motion or other paper" also include such a
signature:
Every pleading, motion and other paper
party represented by an attorney shall

signed by at least

one attorney
37

of a
be

of record in

his individual name who is duly licensed to
practice in the state of Utah. . . . The
signature
of an attorney
or party constitutes
a
certification
by him that he has read the
pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the
best of his knowledge,
information,
and
belief
formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well
grounded in fact . . . If a pleading, motion
or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly
after
the omission is called
to the attention
of the
pleader or movant.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 7 was amended at the same time to provide that the rules
applicable to "signings" will also apply to all "other papers."
A.

Rule 11 Requires

Responsibility

by Counsel

for Every

Filing.

Those familiar with the litigation process know that supporting documents, like an affidavit, are frequently not signed by
counsel, but the Rule is clear that they "shall be stricken" if
not signed promptly when "the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader."

Nielson invoked the "other paper" clause of the

Rule by informing Gurley's counsel that the Affidavit was false.
When they refused to withdraw it, or certify that it was in good
faith, after reasonable inquiry, Judge Moffat ordered it stricken
and noted, in the process, that it was "riddled with untruths."
Judge Moffat was clearly correct, for the United States
Supreme Court has held that the amended rule applies to affidavits
filed with the Court, in addition to formal pleadings.
Guides,

Inc.

v. Chromatic

S. Ct. 922, 935 (1991).

Communications

Enterprises.,

Business
Inc.,

Ill

The High Court gave literal effect to the

Rule's requirement that "every . . . paper" filed with the court
be accompanied by the attorney's certification.
Rule 11 is "aimed at curbing abuses of the
judicial system." To this end, it sets up a
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means by which litigants certify to the court, by
signature, that any papers filed are well
founded. . . . Sentence [1] states that where a
party is represented by counsel, the party's
attorney must sign any motion, pleading, or other
paper filed with the court . . . .
Sentence [6]
dictates that where a required signature is
missing and the omission is not corrected
promptly, the document will be stricken.
(Citation omitted.)
B.

Sanctions

were Properly

Imposed

on

Gurley.

There can be no doubt that sanctions were properly imposed on
Gurley, even though Nielson made no request that his attorneys be
sanctioned (because they refused to sign the offending Affidavit).
The Business

Guides

case, supra.,

applied the "other paper"

language to an affidavit signed by a party and emphatically
disposed of any contention that a represented party who signs is
relieved of or subject to different standards under Rule 11:
This reading [viz.,
exempting a represented
party's affidavit from Rule 11] is inconsistent
with both the language and the purpose of Rule
11. . . . "When a party is represented by
counsel, it is unnecessary, but not improper,
for the represented party to sign as well."
Accordingly, sentence [5] declares that the
signature of a party conveys precisely the same
message as that of an attorney: "The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that . . . it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law" (emphasis by the Court). It seems
plain that the voluntary signature of a
represented party, no less than the mandatory
signature of an attorney, is capable of
violating the Rule. (Citations omitted.)
In Jeschke

v. Willis,

841 P.2d 202, 205 (Utah App. 1991)

Gurley's former counsel, Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham,
urged that in analogous circumstances sanctions should be imposed
against former Attorney General Robert Hansen for the following
reasons:
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Hansen was on notice that Jeschke made various
misrepresentations during his deposition
regarding his injuries and the damage to his
truck. Hansen was shown photographs and
documents from a prior rear-end collision that
Jeschke had been involved in. The evidence
established that Jeschke's claims were meritless,
and this evidence was easily accessible to Hansen.
This Court adopted Mr. Stringham's argument and held that "Rule 11
requires an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry as to the facts
and law before signing and filing a document."

We submit that

applying the same holding herein was correct, for the language of
Rule 11 is plain and explicit and makes imposition of sanctions
for breach of that standard mandatory:
. . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose

upon the person who signed, a represented
party,
or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred

because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorneys
fee. (Emphasis added.)

C. The Order to Strike
Nielson's Offer to

was Proper,
Mitigate.

Counsel Having

Declined

Cases decided under the federal rule have held that a party
seeking sanctions has a duty to mitigate damages by resolving such
questions by the least expensive alternative.
Capitol
Nat'l

Air,

Inc.,

E.g.,

797 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1986);

Bank v. Kroger

Co.,

Brown v.
Michigan

619 F.Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mich. 1985).

Nielson therefore considered it prudent, and consistent with
the mitigation requirements to resolve the problem by invoking the
language of Rule 11 that "[e]very pleading, motion, and
paper

other

. . . shall be signed by at least one attorney of record"

before resorting to the sanctions provision of the Rule.
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Multiple

letters were directed to Attorney General Van Dam and his
deputies, copies of which were attached to the motion, to satisfy
the implicit requirement that the offending party be notified and
given an opportunity to comply voluntarily before bringing a Rule
See, Thomas v. Capital

11 motion.

880 (5th Cir. 1988); Matthews
(E.D. Pa. 1989).

Sec. Serv.,

v. Freedman,

836 F.2d 866,

128 F.R.D. 194, 196

Gurley's counsel refused to either withdraw the

Affidavit or certify it as the Rule requires.

Rule 11 provides

that the pleading shall then be stricken:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant.

D.

The Affidavit

was Perjury,

Compounded.

There can be no doubt that the opinion of Judge Moffat that
Gurley's Affidavit (R. 416) was "riddled with untruths" was correct.
To state that "a copy of [the citation] is attached," when it is the
"Defendent's [sic] copy" (see lower left hand corner of the phony
citation)V

„ a copy, it must be observed, which was not and
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could not have been "served" —

is a blunder of such enormity that

it removes any possibility that the statement was advanced in good
faith or with the care which should attend either a statement under
oath or a solemn act like charging one with a crime.

Stating that

"I issued a citation," when there was none, cannot be dismissed as a
mere "error."
The perjury, moreover, was not confined to "one of the statements . . . to the effect that a citation had been 'issued7 and
'mailed to7 Nielson."

(Br. 41.)

Representations that Gurley did

not know who the pen belonged to, did not destroy it, did not
observe game farm feeding and watering systems and did not release
the bird are inconsistent with his own attached report reciting
those matters.

The phony "citation" lists a fictitious court

(there is no "6th Circuit Court" in "Tooele, Utah"—Tooele is the
Third Circuit Court); has no direction to appear not "sooner than
five days or later than 14 days" as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-7-19(2); contains information such as Nielson's address and
employment which Gurley admitted that he copied from the Summons
served on him after

the date when the phony "citation" supposedly

was "issued"; falsely states that the "Dated Notice Issued [was]
9/13/90."

Moreover, the signature of Dale Gurley on the phony

"citation," which then became part of the official records of the
State of Utah, falsely certifies to each of these matters.

There

are other falsehoods about the bird being wild, no one being present
and not knowing the purpose of the pen which were obvious to Judge
Moffat.

There is no possibility a seasoned peace officer like

Gurley, with more than twenty (20) years of experience, could have
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made such mistakes unintentionally.
E.

There was no Award of "Attorneys'

Fees."

It is incorrectly stated that Judge Moffat awarded "attorney's
fees to a pro se litigant,"

(Br. 41.)

Judge Moffat's Order, which

is at R. 1536, clearly awards a sanction equivalent to the value of
Nielson's time required to prove the perjury.

It is merely coin-

cidental that Nielson is also a lawyer.
This Court has repeatedly held that the amount of sanctions is
discretionary with the trial court.
Rimensburger,
Taylor,

See,

Rimensburger

841 P.2d 709 (Utah App. 1992); Taylor

770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989).

v.
v. Estate

of

That amount may, in the

discretion of the trial court, be measured by the expenses incurred
through loss of professional time.

Rule 11 is explicit that

sanctions "may include an order to pay the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred . . . ."

The Rule

neither says, nor implies, "except when the party is a lawyer or
pro

se."
The "no attorney's fees to a pro se litigant" argument is but

another bid to mislead, in any event, for Nielson was not a "pro
se litigant."

His complaint was filed pro se,

but he was repre-

sented by Mary Lou Godbe, Esq. in the summary judgment proceedings
and by the undersigned Daniel Darger, Esq. at the time of trial and
in this appeal.

Shall this Court rule that if a lawyer ever assists

in his own representation he is thereafter to be denied due process?
Point V
COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 33
The persistent effort of Gurley's counsel to obfuscate, and
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make difficult the work of this Court was a matter the Supreme
Court directed be considered for an award of Rule 33 sanctions.
Coupled with the continued urging of Gurley's perjury, continuation of the bad faith litigation determined by Judge Young
(including, in particular, gratuitous maligning of a fellow
professional with the "trap" pejorative), and this Court's
observation in Gurley

I that "Gurley's misconduct is disturbing

and may have warranted sanctions" (851 P.2d 1204), decisions of
this Court make imposition of further sanctions mandatory.
A.

Counsel's

Misconduct

Herein

Merits

Sanctions.

Counsel has disregarded the clear rule on appeal, surely known
to experienced counsel such as Mr. Ferguson and WILLIAMS & HUNT
that in appellate proceedings the "statement of facts" must begin
with the findings of the trial court.
Metropolitan

Housing,

Markowitz

& Co. v.

Toledo

608 F.2d 699, 704 (6th Cir. 1979) (factual

determinations of the district judge "must always be the starting
place in any statement of facts for appellate review").
Sparrow

v. Tayco Construction

Co.,

Accord,

846 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah

App., decided Feb. 4, 1993).
Mr. Ferguson has not furnished this Court with a single
reference to the Record —

not one —

and refuses to even acknow-

ledge the findings of fact of the trial court.

Mr. Ferguson

presents, instead, a detailed recitation of the misrepresentations
of the Gurley Affidavit, presenting them as "facts" even though
they were ordered stricken by Judge Moffat after he found the
Affidavit "riddled with untruths."
Rather than refer to the Record, counsel for Gurley cites his
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own Addendum.

This Court surely knows that an "addendum" contem-

plates a "pamphlet" collecting documents in the Record counsel
wishes to call to the attention of the Court.

Gurley's "addendum"

goes far beyond the contemplation of the rules and includes items
which are not even a part of the Record.

We might find that

unobjectionable, for they are authentic, but the manner in which
they are presented and numbered as if the document was the
Record seems calculated to mislead.
Many courts have held it misconduct concerning the appellate
process to misstate the findings of the trial court.
Leach,
Ltd.

938 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1991).
v. Leighton,

Cf.,

Williams

v.

DCD Programs,

846 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1988):

A court should not have to pore over an
extensive record as an alternative to relying
on counsel7s representations. The court relies
on counsel to state clearly, candidly, and
accurately the record as it in fact exists.
Reciting matters such as the "trapping" pejorative as "facts,"
when they have no basis in the record, is conduct unbecoming a
lawyer.

In re Disciplinary

Action

Boucher,

837 F.2d 869, 871

(9th Cir. 1988):
The burden of ascertaining the true state of
the record would be intolerable if misrepresentation was common. . . . In part for his
reason, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(a)(3) requires the appellants7 brief to
contain a statement of facts "with appropriate
references to the record." Counsel's professional duty "requires scrupulous accuracy in
referring to the record." . . . Failure to
comply with the admonition of rule 28(a)(3) can
result in sanctions. (Citations omitted.)
B.

Continued Urging of Gurley's
Perjury and Misuse
"Trapping" Regulations
Merits
Sanctions.

of

This Court recently affirmed a trial court's award of Rule 11
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sanctions for pursuing a frivolous claim in Schoney
Estates,

Inc.,

v. Memorial

224 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah App. , decided October

25, 1993), and held, further, that pursuit of the same frivolous
claim on appeal required the imposition of further sanctions under
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Gurley's counsel continues to urge this Court to rely upon an
Affidavit which Judge Moffat has determined was perjury and
ordered stricken, in its entirety, and which this Court found
"disturbing" in Gurley

I.

Counsel attempts to minimize the

perjury, urging that merely "[o]ne of the statements in the
affidavit to the effect that a citation had been 'issued7 and
'mailed to' Nielson is in error."

(Br. 41.)

Judge Young found

that ploy to be "bad faith litigation" and awarded additional
sanctions in the form of attorney's fees.
Counsel continues, further, to urge an untenable and illogical
interpretation of the "trapping" regulations.

Any fair minded

reading by one schooled in the law would lead to the conclusion
that they apply only to furbearers, and have no application, in
any event, to "inadvertent" trapping.

Yet Mr. Ferguson advances

his untenable argument, and states as a "fact" that the pen was a
"trap," without the candor of even advising this Court that there
is an "inadvertent trapping" exception.
Under the common requirement of Rule 11, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is held that sanctions are appropriate where
the pleading is "legally unreasonable, or without legal
foundation."
cert,

denied

In re Grantham Bros.,
sub.

nom.,

Needier

922 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.),

v. Valley
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Nat'l

Bank,

112 S.Ct.

94 (1991).

Numerous authorites hold similar conduct violative of

Rule 11. Cf., In re Anderson,

128 B.R. 850, 856 (D.R.I. 1991)

(Rule 11 violated when minimal research would have revealed that
legal position was without merit); Hayes and Son Body Shop,
v.

United

States

Trustee,

Inc.

124 B.R. 66, 68 (W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Rule

11 violated when unreasonable interpretation of statute urged).
The leading case of Eastway
York,

Construction

Corp.

v.

City

of New

762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), held that
. . . sanctions shall be imposed against any
attorney . . . when it appears that a pleading
has been interposed for any improper purpose, or
where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent
attorney could not form a reasonable belief that
the pleading is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. (Emphasis by
the court.)

C.

Prior Censure of Mr. Ferguson by the Supreme Court
Sanctions
Particularly
Appropriate.

Makes

Mr. Ferguson's extreme liberty with the facts and law herein
is not isolated, but is his chronic practice.

That Mr. Ferguson

is an "old hand" at lack of candor, when it will aid the cause of
partisan advocacy, is demonstrated by his censure for that very
practice by the Utah Supreme Court.
Ins.

Co.,

See Error

v. Western

Home

756 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,

concurring), where Justice Zimmerman wrote of Mr. Ferguson:
. . . I write only to comment on a troubling fact
not expressly mentioned by the Chief Justice.
In his brief [Mr. Ferguson] . . . . cited
several cases [but] most of the supposedly
supporting decisions relied on by [Mr. Ferguson]
have been overruled or otherwise departed from
within their own jurisdictions. See footnote 2
of the Chief Justice's opinion.
All counsel filing briefs with this or any
other court owe the court a duty to assure that
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stated propositions of law [and, we submit, of
fact] are correct and that cases cited are still
good authority and are properly used. See
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State
Bar, rule 3.3 (effective Jan. 1, 1988). I note
this particular instance of questionable
statements of law and questionable use of
authority as a reminder to all lawyers of their
obligation of candor toward the tribunal, an
obligation that should not be subordinated to the
interests of zealous advocacy.
The prior censure of Mr. Ferguson by the Utah Supreme Court,
it is submitted, is particularly important.

We submit that the

Supreme Court's direction that this Court consider the matter of
sanctions was, or may have been, with an eye to counsel's prior
censure in the Error

case, and that Mr. Ferguson has failed to

correct his practices. We submit that it is important, as well,
to consider that the Utah Supreme Court has held that an attorney
who acts to shield his client's perjury does so under penalty of
severe sanctions.

In re King,

322 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1958).

This Court's recent decision in Schoney

v. Memorial

Estates,

224 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36-37 (decided October 25, 1993) stands as
an eloquent and stinging condemnation of the very practices herein:
A frivolous appeal is one that is "not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify,
or reverse existing law." Further, it is "[o]ne
in which no justifiable question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as
devoid of merit in that there is little prospect
that it can ever succeed." (Citations omitted.).
This Court awarded attorney fees and double costs in

Schoney

because "we see no good faith argument to extend, modify or
reverse existing law." We submit that it should do so herein.
CONCLUSION
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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In

the alternative, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.

In either event, damages for bad faith litigation

should be awarded against Appellant, including attorneys fees and
double costs, and sanctions imposed against Appellant's attorney.
Respectfully submitted this /

day of December, 1993.

Daniel B. Darger
v
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
Cf /*-

this

/

day of December, 1993 to:
Dennis C Ferguson, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*fs&et <ZAL'
(0013/0019/0069)
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23-13-2. Definition*.
As used in this title:

*

*

*

(11) "Feral" means an animal which is normally domesticated but ha* reverted to the wild.

*

*

*

113) "Furbearer"
means fpecies of the
Uabhariscidae, Canidae, Felidae, Muatehdae, and
Castondae families, except coyote and cougar.

*

*

*

(24) "Person" means an individual, association, partnership, government agency, corporation, or an agent of the foregoing.

*

*

*

(28) "Private wildlife farm" means an enclosed
place where privately owned birds or furbearers
are propagated or kept and which restricts the
birds or furbearers from.
(a) commingling with wild birds or
furbearers; and
lb) escaping into the wild.

*

*

*

(31 > ia) "Protected wildlile" means wildlife as
defined in Subjection (43), except as provided in Subsection (b)
(b) "Protected wildlife" does not include
coyote, field mouse, gopher, ground squitrel,
jack rabbit, muskrat. and raccoon.

*

*

*

(39) "Take" means to:
(a) hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture,
possess, angle, seine, trap, or kill any protected wildlife; or
\b) attempt any action referred to in Sok
section (a).

*

*

*

(41) "Trapping" means taking protected wild
life with a trapping device.

*

*

*

(44) "Wildlife" means:
(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp
and crayfish; and
(b) vertebrate animals living in natunv
except feral animals.
19W
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23-17-6.

CHAPTER 17
BIRDS
Section
23-17-1 to 23-17-3. Repealed.
23-17-4.
Crop damage by pheasants — Notice to
division.
23-17-5.
Damages for destroyed crops — Limitations — Appraisal.
23-17-6.
Commercial hunting area — Registration — License required.
23-17-7.
Falconry authorized.
23-17-8.
Dog field meets.
23-17-9.
Training of dogs — Use of protected or
privately owned wildlife.
23-17-10.
Waterfowl stamp required — Wildlife
Board responsibilities — Use of revenues from stamp — Waterfowl Stamp
Committee.
23-17-11.
Upland game stamp — Use of stamp
revenues — Upland Game Habitat
Stamp Committee.
23-17-1 to 23-17-3. Repealed.

1966, 1968, 1902

23-17-4.

Crop d a m a g e by p h e a s a n t s — Notice to
division.
Whenever pheasants are damaging cultivated
crops on cleared and planted land, the owner of such
crops shall immediately upon discovery of such damage notify the Division of Wildlife Resources. This
notice must be made both orally and in writing. Upon
being notified of such damage, the Division of Wildlife Resources shall, as far as possible, control such
damage.
1971
23-17-5.

D a m a g e s for destroyed crops — Limitations — Appraisal.
Whenever pheasants have damaged or destroyed
cultivated crops on cleared and planted land, the Division of Wildlife Resources may pay to the crop
owner for the actual damage not to exceed $200
yearly, if the owner notifies the Division of Wildlife
Resources of the damage within 48 hours after the
damage is discovered. The appraisal of the damage
shall be made by the crop owner and the Division of
Wildlife Resources as soon after notification as possible. If the crop owner and the Division of Wildlife
Resources are unable to agree on the fair and equitable damage, they shall call upon a third party, consisting of one or more persons acquainted with the
crops concerned and pheasants, to appraise such damage; but if these provisions relating to damage claims
are in conflict with the requirements of the federal
Pittman-Robertson Act or the rules and regulations
issued under it, then the provisions relating to damage claims shall be null and void.
1971

Commercial hunting area — Registration — License r e q u i r e d .
U> Any person desiring to establish, maintain, or
operate a commercial hunting area within this state
to permit the releasing and shooting of pen-raised
birds may apply to the Wildlife Board for authorization to do so; and the Wildlife Board is authorized to
issue the applicant a certificate of registration for the
purpose according to such rules and regulations concerning the operation of commercial hunting areas
prescribed by the Wildlife Board. The Wildlife Board
is empowered to determine the number of commercial
hunting areas to be authorized in each county of the
state.
(2) Any certificate of registration issued under
Subsection (1) of this section shall authorize the applicant to propagate, keep, and release for shooting
on the area covered by the authorization such birds as
the Wildlife Board may determine, anal the applicant
may charge a fee for harvesting such birds.
(3) All persons hunting within the state on any
commercial hunting area must be in possession ol a
valid combination license, small game license, or
commercial hunting area license. Hunting on commercial hunting areas shall he permitted only during
ihe commercial hunting area season prescribed by
the Wildlife Board
i»7i
23-17-7. F a l c o n r y a u t h o r i z e d .
The Wildlife Board may authorize the practice of
falconry within the state of Utah and the capturing
and keeping in possession of birds to be used in the
practice of falconry under rules and regulations specified by it.
itm
23-17-8. Dog field m e e t s .
It is lawful within the state of Utuh to hold dog
field meets or trials where dogs are permitted to work
in exhibition or contest where the skill of dogs is demonstrated by locating or retrieving birds which have
been obtained from a legal source. Before any meet or
trial is held, application must be made in writing to
the Division of Wildlife Resources, which may authorize the meet or trial under rules and regulations
promulgated by the Wildlife Board.
i«7i
23-17-9.

T r a i n i n g of d o g s — Use of p r o t e c t e d o r
p r i v a t e l y o w n e d wildlife.
The Wildlife Board may authorize the use of protected wildlife or privately owned wildlife for the
training of dogs within the state of Utah under rules
and regulations it may promulgate.
it*7i
23-17-10.

Waterfowl s t a m p r e q u i r e d — Wildlife
B o a r d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s — Use of reven u e s from s t a m p — Waterfowl S t a m p
Committee.
(1) There is established a waterfowl stamp which
. shall cost $3.30. No person 16 years of age or older
may hunt waterfowl without first obtaining a waterfowl stamp and having that stamp in his possession.
Use of the waterfowl stamp shall be in accordance
with rules promulgated by the Wildlife Board.
(2) All revenues collected from the sale of waterfowl stamps and related artwork shall be deposited as
nonlapsing dedicated credits. These revenues shall be
utilized for the purposes described in Subsection (4)
and for payment of production, sale, and distribution
costs of the waterfowl stamps and related artwork.
Reimbursement for monies expended from waterfowl
stamp revenues used for approved federal aid projects
shall be redeposited as nonlapsing dedicated credits.

D GAME
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(3) There is created a Waterfowl Stamp Committee
to establish rules for the creation of the annual stamp
design. The committee shall consist of five members
who artf appointed by the Wildlife Board. The committee rthnU serve without compensation and advise
the Wildlife Board on the production, sale, and distribution t>f the stamp and related artwork. The Wildlife
Board tfhall be responsible for the production, sale,
and distribution of the stamp and related artwork
and may contract these functions out to any other
person.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (2), waterfowl
stamp revenues shall only be used for the development, restoration, and preservation of wetlands that
will be beneficial to waterfowl. Up to 2(W of the annual revenue generated from the account may be allocated by the Legislature for use by a nonprofit conservation organization for wetland development
projects, in the Pacific fiyway, which will benefit the
watertowl resources of Utah.
IMMS
23.17-11.

Uplund game stump — Use of stamp
revenues — Upland Game Habitat
Stamp Committee.
(1) A* used in this section, "upland game" means
pheasant, quail, chukar, partridge, Hungarian partridge, suge grouse, rutted grou*>t\ blue grouse,
mourning dove, cottontail rabbit, or snowshoe hare.
(2) (a' Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person 16 years of age or older may not hunt upland
gatne without first obtaining an upland game
habitat stamp and having that stamp in his possession.
(t>) ID A person hunting upland game in a
commercial hunting area registered under
Section 23-17-6 is not required to obtain and
possess an upland game stamp.
(li) A person who has a lifetime hunting
and fishing license under Section 23-19-17.5
and has the license in his possession is not
required to obtain and possess an upland
game stamp.
(3) (a> An upland game habitat stamp shall cost
$5.00.
(b) Revenue collected from the sale of upland
game stamps and related artwork shall he deposited in the Upland Game Account created in Subsection (4).
(4) (a^ There is created within the General Fund a
restricted account known as the Upland Game
Account. The contents of the account shall consist of the revenues specified in Subsection (3)(b)
and interest accrued on account monies.
(b> Monies in the account shall be used for the
following:
(i) control of predators;
(in the development, improvement, restoration, or maintenance of critical habitat
through the establishment of landowner incentives, cooperative programs, or other
means;
tin) the acquisition or preservation of critical habitat;
(iv) the production, sale, and distribution
costs of the upland game habitat stamp and
related artwork;
(v) landowner habitat education and assistance programs;
ivi) public access to private lands;
(vii) upland game transplant and re-introduction programs; and

23-10-1
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(viii) payments in lieu of property taxes
for lands purchased with upland game habitat stamp revenues.
(c) Monies in the account may not be used for
the acquisition, development, improvement, restoration, or maintenance of habitat within commercial hunting areas.
(d) N o more t h a n 5% of the net a n n u a l s t a m p
r e v e n u e s m a y be used for landowner habitat education programs.
(e> A p p r o x i m a t e l y 7.V/J of the account m o n i e s
shall be allocated to programs and a c t i v i t i e s rel a t i n g to p h e a s a n t s . T h e r e m a i n i n g m o n i e s shall
b«' allocated to programs and a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g
to other upland g a m e species based g e n e r a l l y
upon the proportion of a v e r a g e a n n u a l h u n t e r
participation for each species.
( 0 Projects for which free public access is assured shall receive first priority for funding from
account monies.
(g> Projects for which public access is assured
sh"ll receive second priority for funding from account monies.
(5) (a) T h e r e is created an Upland G a m e H a b i t a t
S t a m p C o m m i t t e e to establish rules for t h e creation of the a n n u a l s t a m p design.
(b> T h e c o m m i t t e e shall consist of three m e m bers w h o are appointed by the Wildlife Board.
(c) T h e c o m m i t t e e shall serve w i t h o u t compensation and a d v i s e the Wildlife Board on the production, sale, and distribution of the s t a m p and
related artwork.
1W2

Game birds not requiring a certificate of registration are:
All doves and pigeons EXCEPT the following:
Common ground dove
Inca dove
Mourning dove
Ruddy ground dove
White-tipped dove
White-winged dove
Band-tailed pigeon
Red-billed pigeon
Black-necked swan
Black swan
Mute swan
Button quail
Cotumix quail
Ocellated turkey

Columbina passerina
Columbina inca
Zenaida macroura
Columbina ialpacoii
Leptoiila verreauxi
Zenaida asialica
Columba fasciala
Columba flavirastris
Cygnus melanocory phus
Cygnus atralus
Cygnus olor
Excalfactoria ckinensis
Coturnixfail species)
Aariiocharis oceUata

(C) IN TRANSIT
Nonresident aviculturists bringing game birds into
Utah for exhibition and remaining in Utah for a
period not to exceed 120 hours are exempt from
the Rule for Collection, Importation, Transportation and Subsequent Possession of Zoological
Animals (R608-3). However, a health certificate
is required.
R608-4-5 SALES OR PURCHASE
(A) BILL OF SALE
A bill of sale must be given or obtained on all
sales, purchases, exchanges, or gifts, which bill of
sale must contain the valid certificate of registration number of the seller.
(B) RECORDS
Records must be maintained of purchase, sale,
barter, trade and propagation of game birds held
in private ownership; and must indicate the
species, numbers of birds and dates of transactions, and the name and address of persons
involved in these transactions. Said records must
be maintained for the period of time the certificate
of registration is in effect

R608-4-6 APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
To obtain a certificate of registration, a completed
application form and appropriate fee must be
submitted to the Wildlife Resources office (see
R608-4-7) in whose jurisdiction the aviculture
installation is located. If the applicant is a minor,
a parent or guardian must co-sign the application
form and be responsible for compliance with
these rules.
If annual sales for activities conducted under an
aviculture certificate of registration are LESS than
FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, the certificate of
registration fee is TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS,
renewable every five years.
If annual sales for activities conducted under an
aviculture certificate of registration are MORE
than FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, the certificate of registration fee is ONE HUNDRED
DOLLARS, renewable every five years.

State of Utah
Division of Wildlife Resources

Proclamation
for the
Possession of Live Game
Birds

R608-4-7 ADDRESSES OF DIVISION
OFFICES
Salt Lake Office and Wildlife Registration
Office, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84116
Northern Regional Office, SIS East 5300 South,
Ogden, Utah 84405
Central Regional Office, HIS North Main
Street, Springville, Utah 84663
Southern Regional Office, 622 North Main
Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720
Southeastern Regional Office, 4SS West
Railroad Avenue, Price, Utah 84501
Northeastern Regional Office, 152 East 100
North, Vernal, Utah 84078
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R608-4-8 POSTAMBLE
It is provided by law that the above rules shall
have the full force and effect of law. Any
violation shall be considered a misdemeanor and
shall be prosecuted as such. Each act in violation
shall constitute a separate offense.
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R608-4 POSSESSION OF LIVE GAME
BIRDS
R608-4-1 PREAMBLE
The Utah Wildlife Board, by authority granted
under Title 23, Utah Code, hereby issues the
following rules governing possession of live game
birds.
The Rule for Collection, Importation, Transportation and Subsequent Possession of Zoological
Animals (R608-3) does not apply to activities
conducted by holders of valid aviculture certificates of registration.
R608-4-2 DEFINITIONS
(1) Certificate of registration. A document
granting authority to engage in activities not
covered by a license, permit, or tag (UCA 23-132(5)).
(2) Division. The Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources.
(3) Exotic game birds. All game bird soecies
that are not native historically to Utah or nave not
been introduced and established as wild game
birds in Utah.
(4) Game birds. Chachalacas, cranes, currassows, flamingoes, francolin, grouse, guans,
partridge, pheasants, wild pigeons (band-tailed
andred-billed),quail, ratites (cassowary, emu,
ostrich, rhea), tinamou, waterfowl and wild doves
(common ground, Inca, mourning, ruddy ground,
white-tipped, white-winged), including threatened
and endangered species.
(5) Native game birds. Game birds historically
native to Utah.
(6) Naturalized game birds. Game birds
introduced and established as legal wild game
birds by the state.

(7) Private wildlife farm or aviculture installation. An enclosed place such as, but not limited
to, a pen or aviary, where privately owned game
birds are propagated or kept and which enclosure
restricts the birds from escaping into the wild.
(8) UCA. Utah Code Annotated (1953).
R608-4-3 GENERAL RULES
It is unlawful to take any live game bird species
from the wild.
Live same birds may not be released or abandoned without first obtaining written authorization from the Director of the Division. Native and
naturalized game birds that escapefromcaptivity
become the property of the state. If an exotic
game bird species escapes, its owner must make
every effort to recapture it immediately. The
Director may authorize the destruction of escaped
exotic species that are not immediately recaptured.
Any person possessing legally obtained game
birds not properly certified in accordance with
these rules wdl be given 60 days from the
effective date of these rules to obtain a certificate
of registration.
The Division may dispose of game birds not
properly certified in accordance with these rules.
Game birds or their eggs possessed in captivity in
accordance with these rules must be confined to
the registered aviculture installation except when
in transit or absent for display purposes.
Any peace officer or special function officer may
request persons engaged in activities covered
under these rules to exhibit any documentation
related to such activities (including, but not
limited to, certificate of registration, permit,
health certificate, bill of sale, proof of ownership),
any game birds, and any device, apparatus and
facility used for activities covered under these
rules.

(A) CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
1) Certificate Required
t is unlawful for anyone to purchase, propagate,
sell, barter, trade, or dispose of any live game
birds, or their eggs, without first obtaining an
aviculture certificate of registration from the Division.
(2) Activities Authorized in Certificate
Certificate holders may purchase, propagate,
import, export, sell, barter or trade those species
designated on their certificate of registration.
(3) Certificate Nontransferable
Certificates of registration are nontransferable.
(4) Other Rules and Regulations
In many instances, federal, state, county, city or
municipality rules and regulations covering
possession and use of game birds are in effect It
is the responsibility of the applicant to comply
with such rules and regulations prior to applying
for an aviculture certificate of registration.
(5) Exemption
A certificate of registration IS NOT required for a
person to acquire live game birds for the purpose
of training dogs and the sport of falconry;
provided that the birds are banded, are not held
tor more than 60 days, and a bill of sale from a
legal source is in possession.
(B) APPEAL PROCEDURE
See R608-2.
R608-4-4 IMPORTATION AND
POSSESSION
(A) HEALTH CERTIFICATES
All game birds entering the state must be accompanied by a valid health certificate. SeeR52-01
(Utah Department of Agriculture Rules).
(B) EXEMPT SPECIES
A certificate of registration IS NOT required for
importation and possession of the game bird
species listed below. However, a health certificate is required to import ALL live birds.
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
V.

:
:
:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

:
:
:'
:

Civil No. 90-0300-302
and
Civil No. 91-0300-249

Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant Dale
Gurley, through counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson of the law firm of
Williams & Hunt, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final
Amended Judgment of the Honorable David S. Young entered in this
matter on January 27, 1993.
The appeal is taken from the entire Amended Judgment entered
on January 27, 1993, as well as from all prior judgments entered
in favor of plaintiff, including without limitation the Court's
Minute Entry dated December 18, 1992, Partial Summary Judgment,
entered in favor of plaintiff on June 24, 1991, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law signed by the Court on January 5 and
entered on January 7, 1993, the Order entered by Judge Moffat on

January 31, 1992, purporting to grant plaintiff an award of
attorneys' fees as a sanction.

Appeal is also taken from the

trial court's denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant's Motion for
Relief from Partial Summary Judgment and defendant's Motion for
Relief from Order of Judge Moffat entered on January 31, 1992.
DATED this 26th day of February, 1993.
WIipiAMS & HUNT

by 1^A\AJ
Dennis C. Ferguson
1
Attorneys f o r Defendant
017669
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant
herein; that she served the NOTICE OF APPEAL in Civil Nos. 900300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third District Court for
Tooele County, upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City,'Utah 84111
Harold G. Christensen
Richard A. Van Wagoner
Snow, Christensen fc.Martineau
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the
day of February, 1993.

Q^

Heather^-fiarney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
February, 1993

Notary Puhlb
.CRISTINH.UO/^'.
257 East 2C0S"->. SCO I
Slit Lako City, o* •:
1
My
Commissi: ^ c . r•S 1
1
July30.1994
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2 ^
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day of

p

cary
Residing in the State of Utah
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,

]

Plaintiff,

i
]i
i

vs.

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Civil Nos. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249

DALE GURLEY,
i

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following
J U D G M E N T
1.

The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991,

is affirmed and adopted herein.
2.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract.
4.

Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the amount of $2,3 00.00
5.

Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting

in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or
indirectly, described as follows:
Township
Section
Section
Section
6.

9 South, Range 6 West. SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Plaintiff is awarded costs, and attorneys7 fees in the

amount of $15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56.
ENTERED this ^7

day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

hi
DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge
(0633N)
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PARKER M. N1EL.SON (...)
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Salt Lake City, UT '-^ i .
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*• •
- 11 SO
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, t._ ie
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]

Plaintiff,,

I

Defendant,

I
1
]
1
]

DALE GURLEY,'

JUDGMy0-ujuu-^.j2
91-0300-249
J i idge Da < :i :1 S

i 1 : i n l :j

The Court having entered Partial Summary .Judgment herei n dated
June 24 , ] 991, and having tri ed the issues remaining on October 21
i thout a jury, a i id 1: lav i n g entui • x x t s

ai id 22 , 199 *!,,

Memorandum Decision dated December 1 8, 1 9 9 2 , and ha\:n- entered
formal Find i ngs of I'Yict and C'onc] us ions of I .aw based thereon
NOW, Ti lEREl^URJi,, the Coiii: t makes and enters tl: ie fol ] owing
.T TT n r K E N T
11:

:.

-

-'.wir1

Judgment

fc-

-udgment previously entered on June 4, *j9i,

u-ante-:

• favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant wn i-iaxiiLj.il' t» ^xaxm of conversion.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract.
4.

Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the amount of $2,3 00.00
5.

Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting

in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or
indirectly, described as follows:
Township
Section
Section
Section
6.

9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of

$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
ENTERED this

£>

day of

J2^^^r^l992>.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S.

District
(0633N)
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L, AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
DALE GOURLEY,

9003000302 and
9103000249

Defendant

jury was waived. .IK. . uii considered all remaining ivsues oi taw. a;

„v. presented by

member of the bar and by his attorney, Daniel Darger. The defendant was present and
represented by his attorney, Du .

»><^on. The court heard the testimony

witnesses as presented, received u». evidence introduced both documentary and testimonial
and further heard the arguments of counsel and based on the foregoing renders its
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1.
Septembi

This action arose through the conduct of the defendant on or about
:rein the defendant forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes

referred to by the defendant as a "trap," forcefully disiurbed the enclosed nature of the pen,

tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took certain private property that was
located there without the consent of the owner.
2.

At the time the defendant engaged in such conduct, he knew or should

have known that the pen was being used or could have been used in connection with
appropriate sport dog which training had been conducted at that location for some years
prior. The defendant knew or should have known that the property was that of Parker
Nielson, the plaintiff in this action.
3.

The court finds that the defendant knew of the activities of dog

trainers in that area, both in training their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that the
defendant had openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike for their
activities. Further, the defendant knew or should have been chargeable with the duty to
know that his predetermined opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement
peace officer and that those individuals engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully
authorized to engage in such and the defendant's conduct in complicating their activities was
an inappropriate predilection and bias from which the defendant should have refrained.

The

court finds that it is not illegal to own, posses, or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture
cones nor is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private ownership lawfully by
means of a recapture cone or pen.

2

4.

"nie com I recognizes that it could occur that wild game could bo M>

21 ,j mured and the pen owner would be obligated to release such "wild" game or unbanded
.,

(

not expected to be any vtiucker/pu.tndge wild gjr.ie i

^ s showed that there was

*K* a<o and the defendant's own

miles distance.
5

The court finds that the defendant did act with malice, both in his

gi iii-1111 \ in Mi' 111 ill ie cl ;: li u a ii lii ig a :ti itj ai id i i i pa i tici iila i lo Mr. Nielsoi i vhom ne > -v
or should have known, had an appi opriate leasehold interest and the right, to retake banded
birds pi in: cl ia se .d f ::»! * i pil: 11| i!i ;|- - l>1; : 1 ' Il£ ;|: a:l *•:1' 1| " > :- d ii i ti ail ill ng
6.

1 he court i in 1 her t inds that the defendant went beyond his appropriate

the Utah Division of I -ands ai id I :orestr> ai id then officials in seeking to ha\ e tl lose
government agencies investigate the activities oi tl: ie plaintiff ai id create pi.-nieu* -

^

plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful activities.
7.
tl

The coin t finds that the defendant specifically attempted to diminish

:

.nterested in

Forest bervKC tn taking boresi Service omuu.s to the plaintiffs leased premises and in
aiietupLiiti'1 lo pci MJiidi,

IIH

is.!, ul I n mi.l I. ill lat ill ic p h IIII itil II * a; ; li espassing oi l I: "orest Service

land and was conducting unlawl ul activities thereoi I.
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8.

The court finds that the defendant's conduct was beyond the scope of

his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted.
9.

The court finds the defendant's conduct was wrongful and constituted

an effort to disregard the proclamations of the Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis
upon which the court could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual basis to
enjoin the defendant individually from such conduct both in relation to the plaintiff's
leasehold land interest and in relation to others similarly engaged in lawful activities
throughout the state.
10.

The court finds that the evidence established at trial shows that the

defendant acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless way in disregard of the rights
of the plaintiff and his leasehold interest in the land in question. The court notes that the
uncontroverted evidence is that land useful for dog training of the type and description
herein is difficult to find, difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the purpose
of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of the range of six square miles, is
ideally necessary for this kind of activity. This location is one of the very few potential
sites available to dog trainers in the state of Utah.
11.

The court finds that since the underlying ground leasehold interest

remains intact and there is no present indication that it will not be renewed, that no
damages should be assessed for the interference with the leasehold activities as a result of
the destruction of the pen.
4

• 12.

The • ;: • : 11 ,• t f inds that the supervisors of the defendant n 1 tl ie Division of

Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of the defendant's dislike for the activities
of

.iould

have n-

disciplined Uis defendant pnoi ».. trw destruction hv ih. Jelcik^m .-'*

plain iii

the defendant's misconduct ai id afl irmatively tried to limit the defendant and shouic
sought to remedy the situation with the plaintil i
13.

1 he c oi ill 1 inds that the defendant's claim that the pei i was a "trap"

under the law is not supported by the evidence and the defendant has failed to meet his

this was an appropiiaie recapture pen that were ki lown or should have beei I ki now i i lo the
def endant

I he) ii icli ide bi it i u e i ie t lii lit : i t : lllr :: t : 11 : • n lg:
a.

The pen was on land known used for upland game dog training

by Parkei Nielsoi i ai id others and should have caused the del endant to be
aware

| } i a l recapture pens could be placed thereon.
b.

At the site of the pen, their were bands used for banding

those bands could be placed on wild game so captured, the del endant should
have rec a I le d 11 i a t n o

i;

• i I d c I I u c k e i",11 p a i 11 i d g e 1 i a d b ee i i s I g I it t e d 11 i t It i a t a re a

by him and that bet oi e destrc- " - " - *y r-«<. he at least could 1 lave takei I
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the band numbers and inquired whether those bands had been appropriately
sold to a licensed "chucker/partridge" bird owner.
c.

The recapture cones are designed to recapture, without injury,

training birds and that should have given the defendant an obvious indication
that the pen could be their for a lawful purpose.
14.

The defendant had multiple indicators that the pen was there for a

lawful purpose and could have at least, without offensively, knocking it down, releasing the
birds contained therein and destroying the pen, made appropriate inquiries as to who the
owner might be, as to whose land it might be positioned on, and whether the pen could have
been placed there for a lawful purpose.
15.

The court further finds that the defendant has in the conduct of the

defense intentionally filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally taken a
defensive posture that was inappropriate under the circumstances in that the defendant or the
Division of Wildlife Resources should have readily offered to remove the defendant from
further enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that the defendant
maintained continuing hostility toward the plaintiff and his activities.
Based upon the foregoing, the court makes its

6

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, is

affirmed herein.
2.

That the ownership, possession, and operation of the bird pens for

domestic birds properly equipped with recapture cones or devices is a lawful and proper use
under the laws of the state of Utah.
3.

Peace officers, including conservation officers such as the defendant

are prohibited from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff.
4.

The defendant in this case may not be heard to claim that the

plaintiffs pen was there for the intended capture of "wild" birds as it was being used
appropriately and within legal rights.
5.

The court finds that the damages to the pen and the replacement costs

assessed in damages to the defendant are $2,300 00.
6.

The court finds tji^t the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under

§ 78-27-56 of * IS*; DPd . —
7.

f^Xj

The court finds that it is appropriate to issue a permanent injunction

against this individual defendant from further activities on the plaintiffs leasehold land in
relation to Wildlife Management activities. This is not mconsistent with the defendant's
duties under the circumstances since the defendant has been transferred to Cedar City, and

7

should thus have no objection to avoiding any future confrontation associated with the
plaintiff and the land in question.
8.

The court declines to grant further punitive damages. The plaintiff is

awarded damages and fees as stated herein and costs incurred herein.
DATED this dll

day of T ^ ^ ^

1

^
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^-

1992.

JAVID S. YOUNG
District CoimJtfuge
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

]
|
i
I
]
I

vs.
DALE GURLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil NOS. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992,
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and
represented by his counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq., and the
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel,
Daniel Darger, Esq., and the parties having presented evidence,
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated

December 18, 1992.
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, Dale

Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took
certain private property located there without the consent of the
owner.
2.

At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or

should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property
was that of Plaintiff.
3.

The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog

trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike
for their activities.

The court finds, further, that Gurley knew

or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at
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paragraphs D through F of the Partial Summary Judgment herein
dated June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted
herein by reference thereto, and that persons engaged in the sport
of dog training were fully authorized by law to do so and that
Gurley's conduct in complicating their activities was an
inappropriate predilection and bias from which Gurley should have
refrained.
4.

The court finds that it is not illegal to own, possess, or

operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones or devices, nor
is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private
ownership lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen.
5.

The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game

could become captured in a lawful device such as Plaintiff's pen
and that the definitions of "take" and "trapping" in the Fish and
Game code, their reference to "attempt[ing] any action" in
particular would obligate the owner to release such "wild" game
when so captured.

However, the testimony of the witnesses

established that there was no expectation that any wild Chukar
Partridge would be in the area of Plaintiff's pen and Gurley's own
testimony was that he had not seen any in the area of Plaintiff's
pen but had seen some at approximately five miles distance.
6.

The court further finds that Gurley acted with malice,

both in his general views of the dog training activity and in
particular to Plaintiff, whom he knew or should have known had an
appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake game birds
lawfully acquired from a private wildlife farm and used in dog
training.
3

7.

The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate

duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry,
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities.
8.

The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to

diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities
thereon.
9.

The court finds that Gurley's conduct was beyond the scope

of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted.
10.

The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and

constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon,
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah.
11.

The court finds that the evidence established at trial

that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold
interest in the land in question.
4

The court finds that the

uncontroverted evidence established that land useful for dog
training of a suitable type and description is difficult to find,
difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the
purpose of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of or
in the range of six square miles, is ideally necessary for such
activity.

The court further finds that the evidence established

that the location of Plaintiff's leased land is one of a very few
potential sites available to dog trainers in the State of Utah
which are so suitable.
12.

The court finds that since Plaintiff's underlying

leasehold remains intact and there is no evidence of a present
indication that it will not be renewed, no damages should be
assessed for Gurley's interference with Plaintiff's leasehold
activities resulting from his destruction of Plaintiff's pen.
13.

The court finds that the supervisors of Gurley in the

Division of Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of
Gurley's dislike for the activities of Plaintiff and others
engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should
have appropriately disciplined Gurley prior to the destruction by
Gurley of Plaintiff's pen.

The court further finds that the

supervisors of Gurley in the Division of Wildlife Resources should
have readily acknowledged Gurley's misconduct and affirmatively
restrained Gurley and sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's
misconduct with Plaintiff.
14.

The court finds that Gurley's claim that Plaintiff's bird

pen was a "trap" is not supported by the evidence and Gurley has
failed to meet his burden of proof that the pen was used as a
5

"trap" or with the intent to "take" any "protected wildlife."
15,

The court finds that there were several indicators that

Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not
limited to the following:
a.

The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland

game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be
placed thereon.
b.

Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully

acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at
the site of the pen.
c.

Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be

placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located.
d.

Gurley should have inquired, before destroying

Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog
training.
e.

Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have

observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture
training birds without injury and it should therefore have
been obvious to him that the pen was maintained for a proper
purpose.
16.

Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was

there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the
6

reasons determined in the Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted herein by
reference thereto, before offensively knocking it down, releasing
the birds contained therein and destroying the pen, to make
appropriate inquiries as to who the owner might be, as to whose
land it might be situated on and whether the pen was there for a
lawful purpose.
17.

The court further finds that Gurley has intentionally

filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally
conducted a defense that was inappropriate under the circumstances
and was without merit and not asserted in good faith.
18.

The court further determines that the lack of merit and

bad faith of Gurley's defense includes that Gurley or the Division
of Wildlife Resources and its representatives, including their
representatives herein, should have readily offered to remove
Gurley from further enforcement activities on Plaintiff's property
knowing full well that Gurley harbored continuing hostility toward
Plaintiff and dog training activities.
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

The Partial Summary Judgment herein dated June 24, 1991,

is reaffirmed and adopted herein.
2.

The ownership, possession and operation of a bird pen for

live game birds, lawfully acquired, equipped with recapture cones
or devices, is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 23-17-2 and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3.

7

3.

Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as

Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by
Plaintiff.
4.

Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen

was there for or intended to capture "wild" birds as it was being
used appropriately and within legal rights.
5.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of conversion.
6.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease
agreement with the State of Utah.
7.

The court finds that the damages to the pen and

replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are
$2,300.00.
8.

The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's

fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00.
9.

The court finds and determines that the damages resulting

from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are
difficult or impossible to determine, including because
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System
Inc.

v.

Dixon,

Concepts,

669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that

Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature,
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to
8

continue, and that there is a need to enjoin and restrain
Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any persons acting in
concert or participation with him from further activities in
relation to Wildlife Management on Plaintiff's leasehold land in
the vicinity of Vernon, Utah, or from attempting to diminish the
relationship of Plaintiff and others interested in dog training,
including by attempting to persuade the United States Forest
Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry that their
activities are unlawful.

The court further finds that such an

injunction is not inconsistent with Defendant's duties under the
circumstances, since the evidence indicated that Gurley had been
transferred to Cedar City and thus should have no objection to
avoiding future confrontation with Plaintiff, dog trainers or the
land which is the subject of this suit.
10.

Plaintiff is awarded fees as stated herein, and costs

incurred herein,
rein.
ENTERED this

^—^
S^d&y

of^fee«!*w^l99^r
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S./YOUNG
District xourt AJucIg^
(0633N)

Jfr
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Telephone: (801) 532-1150
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removing the wire netting from the door, disturbed or interferred
with it by tipping it on its side, removed or dismantled parts of
the enclosure and took private property located therein without
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B.

Defendant knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, that the

pen or enclosure was used in connection with dog training, and
Defendant was informed or had reason to believe on September 8,
1990, that the pen or enclosure and property therein belonged to
Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was staying in a camper behind the
store in Vernon.
C.

It is admitted that Plaintiff was known to Defendant since

at least 1986.
D.

It is uncontroverted, and the court takes notice of the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 and the Proclamation for
Taking of Upland Game, that "it is unlawful for any person,
without the consent of the owner or person in charge of any
privately owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy any . . .
enclosure".
E.
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own, possess or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones
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mi II III I I
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nT a b i r d pen

for

domestic game birds equipped with recapture cones or devices (or a
"bird trap," if the structure alleged herein can be so described)
is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 23-17-2 declaring that *[i]t is unlawful for any person to take
any birds not held in private ownership legally acquired. . ."
(emphasis added) and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3
prohibiting the release or abandonment of live game birds without
a permit but permitting the use of live game birds for dog
training if banded and lawfully acquired.
3.

The recapture of live domestic game birds, lawfully

acquired pursuant to the Proclamation for the Possession of Live
Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § 608-4, including by means
of bird pens equipped with recapture cones or devices (or a "bird
trap," if the structure alleged herein can be so described) is
lawful and proper, including under provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 23-13-2(39) defining "wildlife" as including "any species of
vertebrate animal life except feral animals generally living in a
state of nature" and Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-1(9) defining "feral
animals" as meaning "any animal which is normally domesticated and
which has reverted to the wild."
4.

(Emphasis added.)

The provisions of the Proclamation for the Possession of

Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3, that
"[n]ative and naturalized game birds that escape from captivity
become the property of the state" do not prohibit the recapture of
domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, which are used in dog
training unless they "escape" from captivity by their owner and
"revert" to the wild such as by reproducing in a state of nature.
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including the defense of truth of any statements that Plaintiff
violated the law), respectively.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

i
]\
i

ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT
OF DALE GURLEY AND
FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

vs.
I

Civil No. 900 300 302

DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

I
]

Judge Pat B. Brian

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11 having been submitted for
decision pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)(d), Rules of
Judicial Administration, and the Court having considered
Plaintiff's motion and the documents attached thereto, Plaintiff's
memorandum in support thereof, Defendant's memorandum in
opposition dated November 25, 1991, together with the attachments
thereto, and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike Gurley Affidavit dated December 2, 1991; and the Court
having entered its Minute Entry dated December 23, 1991, finding
(1) that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1990, does
not comply with Rules 7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
(2) that the Gurley Affidavit dated April 18, 1990, is riddled
with untruths, and (3) the Court adopts the reasons stated by
Plaintiff in his motion, and in particular as stated in

Plaintiff's reply memorandum including that Gurley either made a
knowing misrepresentation or knowingly made a false statement that
he knew the matters stated in the affidavit to be true, for the
purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in this litigation
wrongfully and without just cause or excuse; and,
The Court having further determined that Gurley is a "party"
who signed said Affidavit in violation of the provisions of Rule
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact, and,
The Court having determined that sanctions will be awarded
against Gurley, and
The Court having considered the Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson
concerning his professional time in searching the records of the
Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the Sixth Circuit Court
in Nephi, Utah, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of Rule
11 and in filing and briefing Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Dale Gurley or Require Compliance with Rules 7 and
11, and having considered the Affidavit of Paul T. Moxley
concerning the reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time,
and having determined that the amount of $3,289.00 is equal to the
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in that
regard, and
Being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
- 2 -

ORDERED,
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley

or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11 is granted.
2.

The Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is

hereby stricken, however and wherever it may appear in these
proceedings, for the reasons that it was not signed or otherwise
certified by at least one attorney of record, as required by Rules
7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because it is clear
that it is riddled with untruths.
3.

Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and against

Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of $3,289.00, representing the
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in
searching the records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts,
writing correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary compliance
with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the motion granted herein.
4.

It is further ordered, pursuant to provisions of Rule

4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, that this order shall
be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
expended in collecting said amount awarded as sanctions by
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this

->/

.faay of January, 1992.
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Address of Judgment Debtor:
Dale M. Gurley
328 North 700 East
Payson, Utah 84651
Social Security No. (unknown)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 3~rd- day of January, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT
OF DALE GURLEY AND FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS was mailed first class,
postage prepaid to:
John P. Soltis
Reed M. Stringham III
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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